

Man-Person of Dialogue in the Light of Karol Wojtyła's Personalistic Vision

by Aloysius Widyawan Louis

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de Navarra

ALOYSIUS WIDYAWAN LOUIS
**Man-Person of Dialogue
in the Light of Karol Wojtyła's
Personalistic Vision**

[La persona del dialogo en la visión personalista de Karol Wojtyła]

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Facultad Eclesiástica de Filosofía

Aloysius WIDYAWAN LOUIS

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Presentation

Abstract: In the midst of the problems of human division and separation which cause various human suffering, dialogue is a way that can give a hope for all mankind to reconcile for the sake of human unity. The path of dialogue is never easy, but it is very possible to realize it because it originates from the very essence of the human being as a person. Wojtyla never specifically wrote about dialogue, but as a pope, he is known as the Pope of Dialogue through his work and actions. All those were rooted in his mature philosophical thinking about the man as a person in the dynamic correlation with the action. This thesis wants to make explicit Wojtyla's personalistic thought about dialogue so that it can be a theoretical and practical inspiration for dialogical actions or movements that use dialogue as a way to some certain good.

This Wojtyla's personalistic thought of dialogue can be understood in three inseparable dimensions. First, dialogue has an anthropological dimension because it is rooted in the dynamic relationship between the multiplicity of person in the community through participation. Second, dialogue also has an epistemological dimension because it is a searching together for truth. Third, dialogue has an ethical-axiological dimension because it is a shared path to realize the common good. From his various actions during his pontifical ministry, it must finally be realized that dialogue has a practical character. Dialogue is thus an *actus personae* that must be realized. To realize a dialogue, several basic attitudes are needed, including: love of the truth and humility in the presence of the truth, the openness to the others, mutuality including mutual acceptance, mutual understanding, solidarity, refusing conformity and withdrawal to the community, and finally, *metanoia*.

Keywords: *actus personae*, participation, dialogue.

Resumen: En medio de los problemas de división y separación humana que provocan varios sufrimientos humanos, el diálogo es un camino que puede dar una esperanza viva para la reconciliación por la unidad humana. El diálogo nunca es fácil, pero es muy posible realizarlo porque parte de la esencia del hombre como persona. Wojtyla nunca escribió específicamente sobre el diálogo, pero fue conocido como el Papa del Diálogo a través de sus obras y acciones que tienen sus raíces en la idea sobre el hombre como persona en su correlación dinámica con la acción. Esta tesis quiere hacer explícito su pensamiento personalista sobre el diálogo para que pueda ser una inspiración teórica y práctica para las acciones o los movimientos dialógicos que utilicen el diálogo como una vía para el bien.

Este diálogo del pensamiento personalista de Wojtyla puede entenderse en tres dimensiones inseparables. En primer lugar, el diálogo tiene una dimensión antropológica porque está arraigado en las relaciones dinámicas entre las personas de la comunidad a través de la participación. Segundo, el diálogo también tiene una dimensión epistemológica porque es una búsqueda conjunta de la verdad entre las personas de la comunidad. Tercero, el diálogo tiene una dimensión ético-axiológica porque es un camino compartido para realizar el bien común. De sus diversas obras durante su tiempo como el Papa, finalmente debe darse cuenta de que el diálogo tiene un carácter práctico. El diálogo, pues, es un *actus personae* que debe realizarse. Para realizar el diálogo, se necesitan varias actitudes básicas: el amor a la verdad y la humildad ante la verdad, la apertura a los demás, la reciprocidad incluso la aceptación mutua, la comprensión mutua, la solidaridad, el rechazo a la conformidad y la evasión, y finalmente, *metanoia*.

Palabras claves: *actus personae*, participación, diálogo.

It started from a personal experience as a vicar of a parish in Surabaya, Indonesia. On Sunday, May 13, 2018, a bomb was detonated in front of the entrance to the church where I worked. Six parishioners were killed and many others seriously injured. That incident touched me deeply as a priest and as an Indonesian. As an Indonesian, I was hurt because for many years we have lived together in a harmony despite our various ethnicities, different cultural traditions and different religions on a strong Indonesian philosophical foundation, in what we call *Pancasila* or the five fundamental principles of our nation. The Catholic Church in Indonesia also tries to actualize dialogue in various forms of activities. Of course, that tragedy really shocked us. Is there something wrong in our coexistence? What have we done? Is our attempt to build a harmonious coexistence through interreligious dialogue in vain?

From that specific experience I then tried to see various conflicts that occur in the world for various reasons. I believe that dialogue is the important path toward peace. However, dialogue is never easy to do. The arrogance, greed, indifference, hatred deeply rooted in history are real obstacles to make a dialogue. Therefore, it is important to find the bases of dialogue rooted in human structures. Although it is difficult, we are still capable of dialogue because, above all, dialogue is not a consensus or agreement, but an encounter of persons.

One of the most influential philosophical currents of the 20th century is philosophy of dialogue. The philosophy of dialogue appears and grows in the Judeo-Christian tradition that is based on Divine Revelation, addressing various approaches (phenomenology, existentialism, personalism, etc.), and at least emphasized the basic anthropological structure of man as a relational or a dialogical being. The affirmation of the person that I am, has no signification without the existence of other and the relationship with other. Therefore, respect for other is absolutely necessary, and responsibility for other is prior to the claim of the I.

However, I chose the personalist vision of Karol Wojtyła to study about dialogue in philosophical perspective for these reasons. Firstly, he considered the interpersonal relationship as a fundamental characteristic of the person without abandoning his Thomistic orientation in which he supported the primacy of person over human relationships. Secondly, he developed profound dialogues and sincere commitments on respect for the dignity of person. He existentially recognized and then spoke of the human dignity from his own real experience as a Pole, a Catholic and a priest, drawing on his intellectual formation, and open-

ing himself to the phenomenological approach to construct philosophically a personal vision. Thirdly, in his personalism, he showed the close relationship between anthropology and ethics. Therefore, his idea of dialogue did not consist of mere theoretical principles, but actually a set of practical principles. He defended that dialogue has a strong root in the personal structure of man. Man was born for communion or «we», and his actions are simultaneously oriented towards reciprocal self-realization and the common good of all. Therefore, in dialogue we start from ourselves, that is, actualization of our natural potentialities which already exists in each of us. Fourthly, as Supreme Pontiff, he was known as the Pope of dialogue because many of his writings and concrete actions were related to many forms of dialogue. And finally, when John Paul II visited Indonesia from October 9 to 13, 1989, he insisted on speaking of the importance of «living in dialogue». He said, «in a culturally diverse society, ‘treating others in a fraternal way’ means ‘living in dialogue.’»

I have first summarized the status questionis: What is the anthropological-ethical foundation of the act of dialogue in Karol Wojtyła’s personal vision? It can also be formulated in another way: what is Wojtyła’s personalistic principle of dialogue in? These questions have allowed me to penetrate Wojtyła’s thought about man as a person which he expressed in his masterpiece, *Person and Act*. I need to make his idea of dialogue more explicit. For that reason, I have had to confront his ideas with those of other contemporary thinkers and interpret his legacy and concrete actions before his election as Pope, as well as during his pontifical ministry.

The objectives of this research are theoretical and practical. The main theoretical objective is to formulate explicitly the Wojtyła’s principles of dialogue, which has turned out to be a complicated task because what he himself said about dialogue is too brief. The practical objective is to formulate some inspirations and the main point of view that are necessary for any social movement for justice, reconciliation and peace which uses dialogue as its main way.

This research tries to bring to light Wojtyła’s idea about the principles of dialogue, especially in *Person and Act*. This idea cannot be separated from his profound analysis of the dynamic correlation between the person and the action. This means that, in order to understand profoundly his idea of dialogue, we have to delve into his idea of man as a person and his dynamic correlation with action, whether in individual or communal experience.

Therefore, this investigation includes an in-depth exploration of his thought. I have tried to understand historically Wojtyła’s thought. I have de-

scribed his life, his intellectual formation as a philosopher and theologian, as well as the influences he received from some contemporary philosophers. Beyond the story, I have made an effort to expose with metaphysical depth his idea of man-person and his dynamic correlation with action. My systematic use of the expression «Man-Person» takes advantage of the virtues of the English language to express both the integrity and the irreducibility of each man that is the objective of this decisive project.

On the one hand, the exploration of Wojtyła's thought has focused on *Person and Act* and some articles published before his election as pope. Since, on the other hand, the direct references to the dialogue are limited and too brief, I have delved into the exploration of his pontifical works. That is why I assume that: 1) there is a continuity and unity between the personalist vision of Wojtyła and that of John Paul II; and 2) there is unity between philosophy and theology, although each one has autonomy as a scientific discipline.

The formulation of the principles of dialogue has involved all the following steps. I explored the history of philosophy and analyzed some thinkers who dealt with dialogue. I realized that Wojtyła surely knew all the authors I have studied. It also helped me to develop an outline of common principles of dialogue. Thus, I could compare them to Wojtyła's ideas or, at least, empower, strengthen and illuminate the brevity of his idea. The philosophers dealing with dialogue can be divided into two categories, namely, those who see dialogue as a path to the truth, and those who see dialogue as a personal encounter in which man fully manifests himself as a relational being. It is more a question of emphasis and not of separation, since it seems to me that these two senses of dialogue can really be found in Wojtyła idea of dialogue in *Person and Act*, albeit briefly and less explicitly.

Wojtyła's notion of dialogue in *Person and Act* contains three inseparable dimensions: 1) the *anthropological dimension* that indicates that dialogue is rooted in the personal values of the human being that are manifested in common action through participation; 2) the *epistemological dimension* that indicates that dialogue is a path towards the search for truth together with the other; 3) the *ethical dimension* in which dialogue is the path together with the other towards the realization of the true common good. These three inseparable dimensions are rooted in the structure of human existence because the human being is not naturally an isolated being but a personal being that exists and acts with the other, a being that is constantly curious and the object of his curiosity is the

truth, and a being that carries out the action, both individual and community, not only for the good, but for the true.

To understand better all these dimensions, I have also considered his writings and activities as pope around dialogue. The key word «dialogue» appears many times in various writings of Pope John Paul II, for example, and in *Reconciliatio et Paenitentia* (1984), in *Ut Unum Sint* (1995) and his homilies and messages of many occasions. From these texts, Wojtyła's personalist philosophy merges with the theological reflections of John Paul II. Meanwhile, there is a lot of data about his dialogue actions that allow them to be interpreted according to what is theoretically established. It allows us to conclude that the three dimensions of dialogue also have a practical character. By practical character I understand that a dialogue that has these three dimensions, although it is always a path and never an end, and allows its fullest meaning to be found in the concrete action of the person, as *actus personae*.

I divide my work in three chapters. The first chapter is a general exposition of Wojtyła's life and his intellectual journey. On both sides, we can understand that his concern for humanitarian issues was based on his personal experience, and on his intellectual formation towards a personalist vision. Any synthesis between experience and the intellectual path was reflected in his understanding of the person-man in its dynamic correlation with action, which was written especially in *Person and Act*. That work is very special not only because of its original subject matter, but also because of its distinctive method. The second chapter is an analytical, creative and critical description of Wojtyła's thought on the person as he had explained in *Person and Act*. Following the classic adage *operari sequitur esse*, Wojtyła aims to reveal who the person (*esse*) really is through the analysis of human dynamism (*operari*). The third chapter can be considered as a synthetic formulation of Wojtyła's principles of dialogue. We can consider three inseparable dimensions of dialogue (anthropological, epistemological and ethical) and the practical nature of dialogue. Dialogue has its fundamental roots in the anthropological basis of the concrete experience of existing and acting together with the other through participation. Dialogue cannot be separated from the searching together for truth and the joint realization of the true common good of the community. Finally, to the extent that dialogue takes place in the context of participation, it is truly an authentic action of the person; it is an *actus personae*.

This writing will focus on two parts of my doctoral thesis about the principles of dialogue and the characteristics of man-person of dialogue. At this

moment of gratitude and joy, I thank God ³ through the intercession of the Blessed Virgin Mary and St. John Paul II during my process. I also would like to thank many people who have helped and supported me, such as Msgr. Vincentius Sutikno Wisaksono, the Bishop of the Diocese of Surabaya for giving me this valuable opportunity to deepen my study in philosophy in accordance with his vision for priesthood formation in our diocese, the Ecclesiastical Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Navarra, and in particular the director of my thesis, Prof. Don Enrique Moros, who has very kindly assisted, encouraged and guided me in the development of my ideas, and the co-director Dr. Joseph Milburn. I also thank my family, friends from social, cultural and interreligious movements who have been fighting together to promote and strive to live in dialogue, especially in Surabaya. Finally, thanks to the members of the tribunal for the effort to read my thesis and for giving the observations of it.

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
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Wojtyła's personalistic principles of dialogue

The principles of dialogue we want to discuss about are based on the twofold structure of the man-person in himself as well as in his relationship with the other within the Wojtyła's framework analysis of the dynamic correlation between person and the action. It means that we cannot abandon his fundamental assumptions about the person in his dynamic correlation with action and his theory of participation. In this sense, a dialogue is not apprehended as a merely communication, conversation, talk, speech nor any similar forms. Unfortunately, Wojtyła does not develop more clearly and explicitly the principles of dialogue in his work *Person and Act*. He only alludes a little bit the principles of dialogue particularly in the relation of participation and the common good within the community. For this reason, in order to understand more profoundly Wojtyła's idea about principles of dialogue, it seems necessary to explore first some ideas of another thinkers about dialogue. To understand it further and deeper, it would be interested if we also try to summarize his idea from some articles and to interpret his concrete actions during his pontifical ministry because it seems important to assume that all his articles and actions can be comprehended as a continuation and fully-actualization of the philosophical thoughts on dialogue that he had previously formulated. In this sense, it is also important to understand his integrated philosophical and theological visions.

1. EXPLORING THE MEANING OF DIALOGUE

In *Person and Act*, Wojtyła explicitly alludes to the principles of dialogue when he mentions the synergy and unity between solidarity and opposition as the authentic attitudes within participation which are very important to obtain

the common good of the community. He said, «The notion of “dialogue” has different meanings, but here we are primarily concerned with the one that is operative in the formation and the strengthening of interhuman solidarity also through the attitude of opposition.»¹ He really realizes that dialogue has various senses so it is important to understand some senses of dialogue that might be considered by Wojtyła. Those senses can give a certain scheme of the idea of dialogue and would also enrich the effort to interpret his writings and concrete actions before and during his papacy. The idea of dialogue has been appeared in the history of philosophy since the Ancient Greek. The scope of its meaning could be very wide ranging from ontology, epistemology, ethics and hermeneutics.

1.1. *Dialogue as A Path toward the Truth*

In the history of philosophy, dialogue had been emerged for the first time since the Ancient Greek, especially as a form through which Plato expressed his philosophy. In those dialogues, Plato almost always narrated of Socrates who were involved in dialectic with his fellows. That dialectic consisted of a questioning-and-answering process between interlocutors about a specific subject matter discussed, especially around the ethical and political life, such as justice, goodness, truth, prudence, etc.² In those dialogues, Socrates, who

¹ PA, p. 412; AP, p. 287.

² Dialectic, which etymologically comes from the Greek word *διαλεκτική* which means to ‘hold converse with someone, to discuss a question or to argue with someone’, have various meanings and it has been used by many thinkers since the Ancient Greek. Plato used it in two different senses. Firstly, he used it at his early dialogues to point out an art of questioning-and-answering which was usually practiced by Socrates in some discussions and debates with his interlocutors, not to humiliate or to assault them, but really to dismantle their views and opinions so all can attain the true knowledge. Secondly, he utilized that term at his latest dialogues regarding the true knowledge of the forms or ideas which can only be comprehended through the human intellect without any interference of the sensible experience or a dialectical dialogue with the others. In this sense, it seems that there was a shift of the meaning of dialectic, i.e., from a method or a way of philosophizing toward the truth to the content of the truth itself, from the practical expertise on using the question-and-answer dialogue and becoming a master of it, to a science that explores the objects. As a method, the dialectic was also commonly practiced at Plato’s Academy and some other academies at that time. (Cf. Thomas Benatouil, «Introduction: Dialectics in Dialogue,» in Thomas Benatouil and Katerina Ierodiakonou (eds.), *Dialectic After Plato and Aristotle*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, p. 1-2; Jean-Baptiste Gourinat, «Chapter 5: Stoic Dialectic and Its Objects,» in Thomas Benatouil and Katerina Ierodiakonou (eds.),

was presented as a humble figure because he confessed that he knew that he was not a wise man and did not know anything, asked some questions to one or a group of fellows who, on contrary, considered themselves or, at least, were considered by many people as a wise. Socrates continued to press his interlocutors with some questions until finally they could no longer answer him and realized their errors and incapability in front of Socrates and other audiences. Through these questions, Socrates exposed their misunderstandings and mistakes, and then he guided them to a right and sophisticated understanding. The process towards a correct understanding is through a dialectical process, which can be described like as the process of a midwife helping a woman to give birth, or a maieutic process. A dialogue can thus be considered not just as an ordinary literary or a theatrical style, but a means as well as a way for people with their various personal identities and diverse opinions to discuss an issue, dismantle a pseudo-knowledge, and direct themselves toward a true knowledge or the truth itself through a series of questions and answers between the interlocutors. It is thus a way of disclosing the truth.³ Consequently, in order to understand and interpret Plato's thought, it is important to pay attention on each of his distinctive dialogues and dialectic.⁴

Dialectic After Plato and Aristotle, p. 135; Cf. Francisco J. Gonzales, *Dialectic and Dialogue: Plato's Practice of Philosophical Inquiry*, Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1998, p. 2-3) Aristotle also developed his own dialectic. On *Topics*, he introduced dialectic as an argumentative art by drawing a deductive conclusion from some plausible and reputable arguments. Whereas, a dialectic for the Stoic referred to one of the scientific disciplines they practiced in their schools. Some of the Stoic introduced the dialectic, together with the rhetoric, as a part of logic. Therefore, the dialectic increasingly had lost its primary and real dialogical aspect that brings together, at least, two interlocutors with their ideas, opinions, visions or dispositions, but was then actually more understood as an exchange of ideas, a part of logic, and the art of argumentation which can all be done in a monologue or just something called 'dialogue in the mind'. (Cf. Thomas Benatouil, «Introduction: Dialectics in Dialogue,» p. 5-6; Cf. James Allen, «Chapter I: Megara and Dialectic,» in Thomas Benatouil and Katerina Ierodiakonou (eds.), *Dialectic After Plato and Aristotle*, p. 17-18; Cf. Paolo Crivelli, «Chapter 2: Dialectic in the Early Peripatos,» in Thomas Benatouil and Katerina Ierodiakonou (eds.), *Dialectic After Plato and Aristotle*, p. 47; Cf. Katerina Ierodiakonou, «Chapter 4: Dialectic as a Subpart of Stoic Philosophy, in Thomas Benatouil and Katerina Ierodiakonou (eds.), *Dialectic After Plato and Aristotle*, p. 114)

³ Copleston wrote that the dialectic had proved something that hurt or humiliated Socrates' interlocutors because their ignorance or mistakes were exposed and their belief were destroyed by Socrates. Nevertheless, it was not the true aim of Socrates' dialectics. The principal aims were always to attain the truth, not in a pure speculative sense, but rather the truth which corresponded to the value of the human soul. (cf. Frederic Copleston, *History of Philosophy, vol. 1: Greece and Rome*, Image Edition, New York: Doubleday, 1993, p. 107)

⁴ Cf. Francisco J. Gonzales, *Dialectic and Dialogue*, p. 1-6.

The form of dialogue and dialectic then evolved into a dialogue within the human mind that brings together various kinds of the ideas, opinions, arguments, even those that are opposed to each other. The way of philosophizing developed in the form of a *disputatio*. One of the Medieval philosophers who used this form of *disputatio* was Saint Thomas Aquinas. In his very systematic works, he usually began his philosophical-theological explanation by displaying various opinions and views well known at that time. He considered those views as the propositions that were generally accepted with the typical expression: «It seems that...». He then also conveyed various views that were contrary to the general propositions in the earlier part, and said: «On Contrary...» He finally explained his own arguments in a response to all general views and answered any doubts that were emerged. It seems that St. Thomas made a dialogue between various existing views on a particular theme, both the vague opinions or arguments that did not have a firm basis or evidence or contra-views. He disassembled and pointed out all errors and misunderstandings, and presented the evidence, and finally he formulated clearly and systematically his own thoughts.

Thus, a dialogue, that initially takes place between two or more persons who are exchanging the ideas to dismantle a pseudo-knowledge and to re-examine the subjective opinions or arguments to find out a true knowledge and the truth itself, has eventually transformed to be a 'dialogue in mind'. Without having to deal with the interlocutors, without having to compose and to become a master of the art of answering-questioning process, the man can just contemplate various ideas, arguments or perspectives in his own mind. This tendency was getting stronger in the Modern philosophy, especially in the golden era of Rationalism and the German Idealism, for example in Hegel's conception of dialectic.

Dialogue was also a key concept on Gadamer's philosophy. On *Truth and Method*, Gadamer points out that the basic of the understanding is a dialogue, that is, a conversation which involves an exchange between the interlocutors or the partners of a dialogue who seek a consensus or an agreement respecting to some certain issues so that the issue determines the dialogue, not the interlocutors.⁵ Even, he insists that the understanding is attained not a subjective

⁵ Cf. Jeff Malpas, «Hans-Georg Gadamer,» *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), downloaded from <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/gadamer/> [accessed: 01/23/2021].

mind alone, but a discourse between the interlocutors so that a dialogue is always a means of bringing forth the understanding.⁶ Such dialogue occurs within the linguistic phenomena so that the language as well as the understanding play important roles in a dialogue. Therefore, Gadamer also emphasizes the primacy of the language in the hermeneutical experience because it determines our mode of being-in-the-world.

Gadamer formulates his thought on the dialogue within his hermeneutic philosophy which is not only a method to understand something, but it is 'a human mode of being-in-the-world' since to understand something means to understand a complex system of the meaning and the context within which the understanding takes place.⁷ The man himself is a being with various limitations since his understanding and language are always framed and conditioned by a certain historicity and tradition. The hermeneutic really intends to help the man to overcome his limitations. Gadamer, however criticized the hermeneutics of Schleiermacher and Dilthey which asserts that it is important for the interpreter to understand the authentic meaning of the text, words, actions, traditions, and so forth, as it was intended by the first or the authentic author. It is impossible according to Gadamer to make such reproduction because the interpreter always lives in some certain circumstances so he is determined by some historical and tradition where he lives.⁸ The interpreter should try to understand it in the bond with his own historicity and tradition. Within both tradition and historicity, there are also the prejudices which are considered by Gadamer neither as an error nor a distortion of the truth, but they are simply the judgments that are rendered before all the elements that determine a situation have been finally examined.⁹ Those prejudices should not be avoided because those will open the scope of our understanding and can build a bridge between the interpreter and the objects of the understanding (texts, events, actions, arts). Therefore, without having to eliminate the prejudices, the understanding would be attained if the new horizon which is more comprehensive were realized.¹⁰

⁶ Cf. Nicholas Davey, *Uniquet Understanding: Gadamer's Philosophical Hermeneutic*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2006, p. 192.

⁷ Cf. Scherto Gill, «Holding Oneself Open in a Conversation» – Gadamer's Philosophical Hermeneutics and the Ethics of Dialogue,» in *Journal of Dialogue Studies*, vol. 3, No. 1, 2015, p. 11.

⁸ Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, translated by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, Second Revised Edition, London/New York: Continuum, 2006, p. 274.

⁹ Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 273.

¹⁰ Cf. Scherto Gill, «Holding Oneself Open in a Conversation,» p. 13.

By horizon he means «our range of vision, which includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point.»¹¹ He adds, «to have a horizon» means not being limited to what is nearby but being able to see beyond it. A person who has a horizon knows the relative significance of everything within this horizon, whether it is near or far, great or small.»¹² The horizon then cannot imprison us, but it can really be transformed and extended through a fusion of the horizons (*Horizontverschmelzung*). It can only be achieved through a dialogue, through which someone opens to the otherness and challenges his own horizon so that he can recognize the particularity of his horizon and of the other's horizon regarding of the universality.

From those important points of Gadamer's hermeneutic, it can be resumed some ethical considerations of Gadamerian dialogue.¹³ First, Gadamer underlines the importance of the openness and the attentiveness of other and otherness. When someone intends to understand something, he will penetrate into something that he has not already known so that he has to deploy a sensitiveness toward the otherness. The presence of the other is meaningful, including his historicity and tradition (social, cultural, or religious) which have formed the otherness, neither as an object nor a passive being, but as a partner of dialogue.¹⁴ In this sense, one should enable himself to care for, listen to, respond, maintain and develop an open perspective, and thereby to bond with the other, even though they are totally different from us and disagree with us about something discussed.¹⁵ Second, Gadamer stresses a task of the hermeneutic, that is, to attain the understanding of something with the other through a fusion of the horizons and such fusion requires a humility to attain with the other the more extent and more universal understanding.¹⁶ Third, a dialogical understanding demands an equality and a reciprocity to deepen the understanding one another and to extend the horizons. Fourth, a dialogue fully occurs in the linguistic phenomena, and the language itself reaches its fullness sense when it is used in a dialogue.

¹¹ Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 301.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Cf. Scherto Gill, «Holding Oneself Open in a Conversation,» p. 15-24.

¹⁴ Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 352

¹⁵ Cf. Scherto Gill, «Holding Oneself Open in a Conversation,» p. 16; cf. Edison Francisco Viveros, «El diálogo como fusión de horizontes en la comprensión hermenéutica de Gadamer,» in *Perseitas* 7(2), 2019, pp. 341.

¹⁶ Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 305

In Gadamer's thought, an authentic dialogue which is understood as the end or the ultimate finality, does not concern with the understanding of the subjectivity of each man who are partners of a dialogue, but rather on the topic or the problem they discussed.¹⁷ The Gadamer's idea of dialogue, therefore, can have the person as its reference insofar as he or she is a partner of dialogue because he or she has any arguments or opinions about something in which he or she are determined by historicity and tradition, by his or her prejudice; it does not have reference to the person as such.

In a certain sense, those ideas of dialogue can be simply seen in the entire of the *Person and Act* when Wojtyła had made a dialogue between the traditional philosophy and the modern philosophy. He considers that the traditional philosophy has the firm, clear and distinct conceptions of reality, but it has to be deepened and become more explicit so it can be understood by the modern thinkers. Meanwhile, the modern view has an inclination toward the idealistic tendency so they concretely ignore the objectivity. The dialogue between the traditional and the modern views generate some new and creative ideas which can sharpen and strengthen the understanding of the integral and irreducible man-person. Wojtyła used many classical as well as modern terms or notions, but he then deepens, enriches, gives those a new nuance after engaging a dialogue between the traditional and the modern philosophy through a complex analytical process. For example, he used the traditional notion of *suppositum*, but after reconsidering through a dialogical process with the modern philosophy through the phenomenology, he reaches a new idea of *personal suppositum*. When he analyzes the traditional notion of *actus humanus* (human act), he reconsiders it into *actus personae* because through this human act, a person manifests himself. He thus goes further from the classical assertion that the human act presupposes a person. In another occasion, he also uses term 'consciousness' which is very common in the modern philosophy regarding of the human subject. However, he rejects the idealistic tendency of the modern philosophy and make it as a part of the human subject which possesses both the subjective and the objective dimension. He also speaks of the common good which is a particular term on the classical ethics or politics, but he mentions that, thanks to participation, it has the objective as well as the subjective dimension. By doing such a way, Wojtyła makes us understand

¹⁷ Cf. Nicholas Davey, *Unquiet Understanding: Gadamer's Philosophical Hermeneutic*, p. 192-193.

some notions of *philosophia perennis* within the modern views as well as some of the modern views which has been sharpened by *philosophia perennis*.

Moreover, Wojtyła also presented a dynamic dialogue between 'being' and 'becoming', the anthropology and the ethics, *theoria* and *praxis*, the principle and the task, solidarity and opposition. In those dynamic relations, Wojtyła seems to show us that the unity between two things that are autonomous, different, and even contradictory, is actually possible to achieve a harmony and the fullest meaning of the reality. The nuance of dialogue never shows the totally rejection of differences and a fear of the otherness. There is no good ethics, for example, without a firm anthropological basis, and the anthropological view has its fullest meaning in the ethical idea that the human being is not a mere natural being, but really a moral being, a being who is in the process of the moral 'becoming'.

Indeed, those ideas of the dialogue that have mentioned above focused rather more on the understanding, the true knowledge, the discussing problem, the agreement which is aimed to, and so forth. Those ideas introduce us to some important principles about dialogue, especially: the acceptance of other and otherness. In that acceptance, it is required an openness to other's differences, including his opinions, arguments, traditions, historicity, etc. It is also required to understand positively the prejudices and always to be ready to re-examine and re-evaluate those for the better understanding. However, those ideas are still lack of the understanding of the personal subjects who are actively participating in a dialogue. It is true that the reception and acceptance of other and otherness always becomes an important starting point to achieve an agreement about something that was talked, but in such dialogue, it may still difficult to understand the idea of self-giving of the I toward Thou, and vice versa, or of the I to «We» or community. We cannot ignore the fact that a dialogue also has to speak of the subject persons who are the agents or actors of dialogue, not focus only on the issues of that dialogue. In other word, an authentic dialogue has to be considered in both its objective as well as its subjective aspects with its dynamisms.

1.2. *Dialogue as An Encounter of the Persons*

The notion of dialogue cannot also be separated from the idea of intersubjectivity which becomes a principal concern of the philosophy of dialogue.¹⁸

¹⁸ The philosophy of dialogue itself is a philosophical reflection on the complex reality and the realm of human relationship. It has emerged as a philosophical current after the human tragedy

In the topic of intersubjectivity, it is important to disclose the idea of otherness and the relationship between the I and the other. On the basis of such ideas, the idea of any kind of the human relation including community or society, can be understood further and more deeply.

In general, the philosophy of dialogue considers a dialogue in the anthropological framework as a way of being a man-person.¹⁹ It directly links a

of the First World War in the early 20th century which left serious scars on humanity. On the one hand, many thinkers reflected that modernity had produced a tendency to exalt the supremacy of human subject over all other realities: nature, man and woman, and God. Briefly, the reality of other was considered only as a mere object, a tool or an instrument to strengthen such supremacy. This supremacy was increasingly more dominant through some certain ideological movements that were embodied in the political powers that led toward some efforts to establish and strengthen the absolute power. To achieve the absolute power, wars, genocides, massacres, and another massive destruction, including some efforts to eliminate the social cultural identity and human civilization were considered as the right way. On the other hand, many thinkers also consider the necessity to reflect the meaning of life not only in the sphere of the individual life but also in the relation with other persons, within communities and societies, facing a tendency, especially toward nihilism.

The philosophy of dialogue had been discussed since 1920s and 1930s, as an intellectual as well as a spiritual movement. It started to be fragmented particularly in the thought of Ferdinand Ebner with his key words such as: the word, love, intersubjectivity, encounter, etc. It did not only broaden a philosophical perspective about the human being, but also channeled and developed further the anthropological researches concerning with the empirical and experiential studies. During 1920s-1930s, some European thinkers such as Franz Rosenzweig, Ferdinand Ebner, or Martin Buber dedicated themselves concerning about the reality that makes a living tension in the human life when the man mutually interacts with other man by actualizing some attitudes which are creative and promotive to know more profoundly the authentic personality. This view always attempts to explore the richness of human relationship as a man's constitutive and essential dimension which had been almost forgotten by the classical ontological vision of the human being which only concerned about the objectivity or essentiality of the man. Those thinkers realized that the richness of human existence is also formed by his or her relationship with the world including with the others.

(See further Alfonso López Quintás, *El encuentro y la plenitud de la vida espiritual*, Madrid: Publicaciones Claretianas, 1990, p. 265-267; also Alfonso López Quintás, «Pensamiento dialógico y su fecundidad,» in J.M. Burgos, J.L. Cañas, U. Ferrer (eds.), *Hacia una definición de la filosofía personalista*, Madrid: Ediciones Palabra, 2006, p. 103-105)

¹⁹ The originality and novelty of this philosophy of dialogue is, according to Coll is a dialogical intuition, that is, a belief that only through a loving dialogue or a dialogical love between I-Thou, both exist as the persons and really obtain an existence proper to the person. The philosophy of dialogue or the personalism of dialogue (*personalismo diálogo*) abandon the old fashion which put the topic of human relation, of the relationship of I-thou or I-other as an additional subject matter regarding the social dimension of the man. The main concern of the old tradition is still in the explanation of person's individual characters, but the philosophy of dialogue put human intersubjective dimension as its priority. (cf. Joseph M. Coll, «Karol Wojtyła, entre las filosofías de la persona y el personalismo dialógico,» in Juan Manuel Burgos (ed.), *La filosofía personalista de Karol Wojtyła*, Madrid: Biblioteca Palabra, 2007, p. 212-213)

dialogue with the structure of human existence in which the man is considered as a relational being or a dialogical existent. To exist as the man-person means to exist and live fully with other, in the communion with other, or, better also to speak, in a dialogue with other. Some thinkers more radically emphasize the primacy of other or of that relationship, over the I. In this sense, a dialogue whose fundamental basis is in the structure of human existence really shapes the man from the very beginning through his existential experiences.

Martin Buber, for example, asserts that «in the beginning is relation.»²⁰ He emphasizes that the basic fact of human existence is man with man, and a dialogue is, therefore, the basic phenomenon.²¹ Therefore, a dialogue is, according to Buber, always a «turning toward the other (*Hinwendung*).»²² When we see and meet someone, we turn ourselves toward him, not only our body and senses, but our entirety as a person. Such dialogue is not limited in the visible interaction between the persons, but it constructs a mutuality of «inner» actions between the persons who are bound in it so each of them directs himself toward the other, visibly in the actions as well as invisibly in the inner consciousness.²³ Consequently, it emerges a responsibility which Buber simply defines as an inner «ought» which exists only as a real responding «to what happens to one, to what is to be seen, and heard, and felt.»²⁴ It is a genuine

²⁰ Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, translated by Ronald Gregor Smith, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1937, p. 18.

²¹ Dialogue as an essential action (*Wesenshandlung*), in which the essential attitude (*Wesenshaltung*) is built up, can only be performed by the essential being, that is, the person. (Cf. Martin Buber, *Dialogue* (1932), in Asher D. Biemann (ed.), *The Martin Buber Reader: Essential Writings*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002, p. 198) He even asserts that a man becomes the «I» in the relationship or in a dialogue with «Thou». By entering the realm of the «I-Thou» with his wholeness, someone who is an «I» takes a risk to get the realm of love and truth because only him who does act, not the other; it is only he who does decide, not the other. The realm of the «I-Thou» is thus considered as a relation and communion because the entirety of one's self enters into a relationship and unity with «Thou». Such relation is characterized by mutuality, full presence, directedness, responsibility, involvement, ineffability, intensity, and without any objectification to other beings. (Cf. Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, p. 14-15, 28; cf. Sylwia Górzna, «Martin Buber, Father of the Philosophy of Dialogue,» *European Journal of Science and Theology*, vol. 10, No. 5, October 2014, p. 46-47)

²² Martin Buber, *Dialogue* (1932), in Asher D. Biemann (ed.), *The Martin Buber Reader: Essential Writings*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002, p. 198; See also, Martin Buber, *Genuine Dialogue* (1954), in *ibid.*, p. 214.

²³ Martin Buber, *Dialogue* (1932), p. 191.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 195.

dialogue in which each participant is aware of the presence of other and turns himself toward the other to build a living mutual relationship.²⁵

Gabriel Marcel, a French philosopher, has a similar echo as Buber when he said: «If I reflect deeply on my own being, I will see in my very depths that I am united with other beings in its own structure of subjectivity already, and in the most profound sense genuinely inter-subjective.»²⁶ The most fundamental of human consciousness and human experience is communal and the movement of his existence directs to a realization of «We» or «Our» in the 'mysteriously intimate way' so that the highest form of his existence is inseparable with the intersubjectivity.²⁷ The ontological man-person is a relational being who actualizes his existence in the relationship with the world and the other person, and only from the sphere of «We», the «I» could be emerged. He said, «What concern us here is only to know under what conditions I become conscious of myself as a person. It must be repeated that these conditions are essentially social.»²⁸ He then formulates that the man's dialogical structure lies on a distinction between the relationship of the man-subject with the objects and the relationship of the man-subject with another man-subject. Only the relationship with another man-subject can be considered because it always as-

²⁵ Buber distinguishes genuine dialogue from «technical dialogue» and «monologue.» Technical dialogue concerns with the intention to obtain mutual objective understanding. Whilst, a monologue is relation between men in strangely tortuous and circuitous ways which disguises as dialogue, that is, a «bending back» (*Rückbiegung*) in which one withdraws from accepting other. He then mentions four types of monologues such as: *debate* (each one is only interesting in striking other in the sharpest way without expressing well his thought, even without regarding the other's presence as person), a *conversation* (characterized by the need neither to communicate nor learn something nor influence other nor to establish relation), a *friendly chat* (in which each just regards himself as absolute, and relativizes or humiliates other), a *lover's talk* (in which both alike enjoy their own glorious soul and their precious experience). He then adds: «*Being* – lived in dialogue – receives even in extreme dereliction a harsh and strengthening sense of reciprocity; *being* – lived in monologue – will not, even in the most tender intimacy, grope out over the outlines of the self.» (Martin Buber, *Dialogue* (1932), in Asher D. Biemann (ed.), *The Martin Buber Reader: Essential Writings*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002, p. 197-198)

²⁶ Cf. Gabriel Marcel, *The Mystery of Being, vol. I: Reflection and Mystery* (1949), translated by G. S. Fraser, Great Britain: Hague Gill & Davey, 1950, p. 182-183; Cf. Thomas C. Anderson, *A Commentary on Gabriel Marcel's The Mystery of Being*, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, p. 79-80.

²⁷ Cf. Gabriel Marcel, *The Mystery of Being, vol. I*, p. 178.

²⁸ Gabriel Marcel, *Homo Viator: Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope*, translated by Emma Craufurd, Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1951, p. 19

sumes a reciprocal or a dialogical openness to the other, and it never happens in the one direction or a monologue.²⁹

Another philosopher whose thought can also be considered as a philosophy of dialogues because of his focus on the other and otherness is Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas has criticized the Western humanism which emphasizes its concern about blindly promoting and defending human dignity as a unique, free, autonomous, self-conscious being. From different point of view from the other philosophers of dialogue but, at least, sounding the same echo respecting to the openness to other, Levinas then purposes the 'humanism of other'. He concerned for a new humanism which is based on the human dignity in its vulnerability and indigence which are presented in the face of other, of whoever presents in front of me. This humanism of the other bases itself on the radical ontology of the alterity, that is, a fact that I am in myself a radical openness to the other. I find my true self, my true identity as a being-for-other, as a fully openness to the alterity and a limitless responsible for the other.³⁰

Therefore, the principal characteristics of dialogue which is rooted in the existential structure of the man is the openness to other because without the other, there would not be an I, a person. This openness totally indicates an acceptance of, and thus, a confirmation of the existence of other with the intrinsic value in himself which is totally different from the I.³¹ Before the pres-

²⁹ Marcel explained that the human relationship can be distinguished in two types, that is, the relationship of I-thou and the relationship of I-him or I-her or I-it. The distinction can be seen by understanding the distinction between an object and a presence. He gave an illustration: One can be in the same room with the other, but somehow, he cannot really present to the others. I may talk with him but it is a communication without communion because he understands what I say to him, but he does not understand me. In this situation, I feel stranger and I am not really myself while I am with him. Thus, he is like as an object for me, and vice versa. On contrary, when somebody presents himself next to me and I really feel his presence, and his presence can refresh my inner being and I could reveal myself so that I am fully myself with him. His presence is charm to me so I feel that he is somebody or a person like me. Therefore, a dialogue only can occur in the I-thou relationship whereas the I-him or the I-her or the I-it is merely a monologue (Cf. Gabriel Marcel, *Mystery of Being*, vol. 1, p. 204-207)

³⁰ Cf. Julia Urabayen, «Emmanuel Lévinas y Karol Wojtyła: Dos comprensiones de la persona y una misma defensa del ser humano,» in *Persona y Derecho*, vol. 56*(2007), ISSN 0211-4526, p. 418; Cf. Juan Manuel Burgos Velasco, «Algunos rasgos esenciales de la antropología personalista,» in *Tbémata*, Num. 35 (2005), Debate sobre las antropologías, p. 499.

³¹ Cf. Martin Buber, *Genuine Dialogue* (1954), in Asher D. Biemann (ed.), *The Martin Buber Reader: Essential Writings*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002, p. 214; See also, Martin Buber, *Distance and Relation* (1950), Asher D. Biemann (ed.), *The Martin Buber Reader: Essential Writings*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002, p. 211.

ence of other, the «I» has responsibility rooted in its self. A dialogue makes the man realizes something inherent in his very existence that the other is never treated as an instrument nor an object, but is always a person for whom I am responsible.³² Even more, Levinas considers that the face of other is not in the indicative sense, but rather more in the imperative, that is, a divine commandment of «Do not kill!» In this sense, therefore, the man is primarily not a free-being, but a responsible being who is able to accept and capture the alterity.³³ From the reality of human existence as a relational or a dialogical being, the man-person realizes himself in the interpersonal relationship, establishes and develops a certain community and society.³⁴

³² Buber, for example, argues that in order to become a person or an I, the man can only mutually consider the other as a «Thou», not as merely an «It», «He» or «She». If the man establishes an «I-it» relationship with the other, he would find a secure or comfortable state. However, if someone lives only in a relationship with It, he is not really a man. In this particular attitude, the sense of being secure is too strong and become the main interest because it places a safety, health, wealth as the primary concerns. The realm of «I-it» thus consists of the utilization, orientation, separation between the subject and the object in which the subject may be able to manipulate, exploit, and use the other as an object for its specific ends which are beyond the object itself. There is, therefore, no mutual relationship to understand, feel and act with the other. (Cf. Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, p. 33-38).

Marcel also considers that the «I» can only be a person because it is given by another person and cannot become a person by itself. When someone treats the other not as a person, he or she enters in a non-relational dimension of the «I-him» because he or she considers the other as a «he» who is treated as the essential absence so he can be objectified. In this situation, the relation of «I-him» then establishes «the world of having» which is characterized with the objectification and the possession because the world where everything is treated as the object, that is, something which is outside of my subject, is opposed to the subject and is never involved in the subject. Consequently, for the subject, such object is something that can technically be manipulated and controlled. The communication in the realm of «I-him» might happen, but it may only happen mechanically, physically, impersonally, and it could never build a communion. In such realm, the man is only a spectator who is strange for the world, and everything seems to be functional, superficial, and depends on its utility. If I treat another person as a «he», I can only see him as a natural being, an animated object. However, when I consider him as a «thou», I treat him and understand him as a free person as well as I treat and understand myself. The freest man is the man who is fraternal to the others because the fraternal man always relates to the others and set him free to encounter with the others in the authentic relationship. (Cf. Joseph Maku, *Dialogue in the Philosophical Anthropologies of Martin Buber and Gabriel Marcel: A Comparative Study*, Extract of the Doctoral Dissertation, Rome: Salesian Pontifical University, 2017, p. 86-87).

³³ Cf. Pope John Paul II, *Crossing the Threshold of Hope*, edited by Vittorio Messori, translated from Italian by Jenny McPhee and Martha McPhee, New York: Alfred A. Kopf, 2005, p. 155.

³⁴ Buber who asserts that a dialogue really forms the man as a person, as an I, thinks that it is impossible to establish a genuine dialogue either in the solitary individualistic realm or in the realm of collectivism. Such dialogue presupposes the personal encounters of man-to-man which, for

The dialogue in this specific sense is also presented by Wojtyła when he explains a dynamic relationship between the man and the other, between the man and the community or society, and between the man's individual interest and the common good. There is the other with all his unique, unrepeatable, and unreducible otherness, who has to be considered, accepted and respected as an I, as another I. Wojtyła also agrees with the importance of considering the subjective dimension of the dialogue and putting a dialogue within the community context. It means that a dialogue has to consider profoundly, first of all, the persons as the subjects who encounter and relate to each other and build an equal and mutual relationship. In this sense, they all agree that a dialogue is found in its fullest sense in the context of the human intersubjectivity as an essential dimension of the human existence.

However, they have a different conception of the person and a different personalistic vision to understand profoundly the man-person. If those philosophers of dialogue purposed the man-person primarily as a relational being, Wojtyła firmly hold the Thomistic view of the primacy of person over the human relationship and community. He does not reject the importance of human relationship. He purposes participation as the man's particular property

him, becomes an original basis of the community because it is primarily emerged from the realm of «I-Thou». Whereas, on Marcel's opinion, the community has an internal togetherness of persons which could be created because they can open to one another and concern of one another. The community is thus not seen in the collectivistic view where it seems to be like as a mass society. The collectivism only has an external togetherness which makes the individuals be able to organize themselves in the systematic and functional groups. In either a mass society or the competitive individualistic society, the man cannot realize himself as a truly person. The community, therefore, is always opposed to individualism as well as collectivism because it is indicated by a communion of the persons, not merely an aggregation of the individual human being. This communion of the persons is characterized itself by the readiness to open to the presence and existence of the others as friends or brothers/sisters (Cf. Joseph Maku, *Dialogue in the Philosophical Anthropologies of Martin Buber and Gabriel Marcel*, p. 65-68, 121-125).

In contrast with those philosophers of dialogue, Levinas emphasizes ethics as the first philosophy rather more than metaphysics or anthropology, because for him, a recognition on human goodness is something more essential within the man's self. He thinks that even though the other is recognized in his social customs and habits, there is always an original experience of the other as such in the encounter of face-to-face, and this experience may only happen in a sociality or an intersubjectivity which is considered as the community of «We». The interpersonal relationship (I-Thou) is outside of it. Therefore, he prefers to consider rather a justice in the community or society where the other is recognized as such, as the other really is, neither as a neighbour nor as a close relative, more than a love within the interpersonal relationship. (Cf. Julia Urabayen, «Emmanuel Lévinas y Karol Wojtyła: Dos comprensiones de la persona y una misma defensa del ser humano,» p. 420-421).

to exist and act together with the other so a person cannot be considered as an isolated being. By purposing participation, he also insists his principal framework of the dynamic correlation between the person and the action in the sphere of human co-existence and co-operation.

Moreover, Buber and Marcel had explained about their anthropological perspective about dialogue which strictly corresponds to the interpersonal relationship. They focus on some basic assumptions and the ends of dialogue within the anthropological issues or specifically within the problem of intersubjectivity. It seems that they overlook some other perspectives that are very close to the anthropological perspective of the dialogue, such as the epistemological which can explain further the relation between a dialogue and the search for the truth, the ethical perspective which can link dialogue with some good or the common good as its end, the social cultural perspective which can understand dialogue in a certain social-cultural context, etc.³⁵ Wojtyła, on contrary, still holds his personalistic view in the framework of the correlation person with his action, and corresponds his idea of dialogue to some other topics such as the truth (the epistemological), justice and the common good (the ethical).

2. THE MEANING OF DIALOGUE ACCORDING TO WOJTYŁA

The exploration of the meaning of dialogue according to some thinkers mentioned above really help us to formulate some key points that should be provided if we want to understand the meaning of dialogue according to Wojtyła. There are several indications that Wojtyła knew those senses of dialogue from those philosophers.³⁶ A dialogue as it was previously explained, can be

³⁵ Cf. Joseph Maku, *Dialogue in the Philosophical Anthropologies of Martin Buber and Gabriel Marcel*, p. 144-145.

³⁶ Of course, Wojtyła had really known the traditional philosophy respecting to the theme of dialogue, dialectic or disputatio as a philosophical way toward the true knowledge or the truth itself since he studied philosophy as a required intellectual formation as a seminarian. One of the important critiques of Wojtyła's fellows in the International Symposium regarding of his work the *Person and Act* held in KUL 1970-1971 is the question of the intersubjectivity. His colleagues criticized his theory of participation which should be based on an anthropological concept of the man as a relational being as same as the philosophers of dialogue, especially like the ideas of Martin Buber. Wojtyła responded that his anthropological basis of participation is still the primacy of the man as a person, not as a relational being. It can thus be assumed that

considered in two contexts, namely, as a path toward the truth (the epistemological dimension of dialogue) and as a reality of the interpersonal relationship which become a basis of the authentic community (the anthropological or the personalistic dimension of dialogue). Both contexts, with some complementary contexts which may be added, should be found in Wojtyła's idea of dialogue.

Wojtyła explicitly talks about the principles of dialogue only in one page of the *Person and Act*, especially in the topic of participation and its relation with the common good of community. It seems that that brief explanation is insufficient to understand what he thought of dialogue. Thanks to the exploration above, we can explore further the sense of dialogue which may implicitly be found in his other writings, especially when he alludes to some basic assumptions of dialogue, including about the interpersonal relationship and the community with its entire richness and complexity. To have broader and deeper sense of dialogue, it is also good to consider his writings and his deeds during his pontifical period which explicitly reveal the idea of dialogue. Let us assume that Wojtyła had formulated and matured his idea

Wojtyła understood well the principal thought of philosophy of dialogue. (See. Karol Wojtyła, «Afterword to the Discussion on Person and Act,» in Karol Wojtyła, *Person and Act and Related Essays*, translated by Grzegorz Ignatik, Washington D.C.: the Catholic University Press, 2021, p. 451-452).

Moreover, he also asserted the importance of the philosophy of dialogue which were introduced especially by Martin Buber and Levinas because it can explicitly speak of the daily existential experience of the man in which the man is always a co-existence respecting to the other. The philosophy of dialogue was emerged within the Jewish and Christian tradition and it was also inspired by the authors' experience of the God's Words. (See. Pope John Paul II, *Crossing the Threshold of Hope*, p. 32, 155; Cf. Juan Luis Lorda, *Antropología cristiana del Concilio Vaticano II a Juan Pablo II*, tercera edición revisada y actualizada, Madrid: Ediciones Palabra, 1996, p. 38). Weigel also told that Wojtyła/John Paul II had known personally and intellectually Emmanuel Levinas as a Jewish Philosopher and the intellectual heir of Martin Buber (See. George Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, p. 467). With Levinas and some other thinkers, Gadamer was also invited by John Paul II in Castel Gandolfo in August 1983 to discuss the topic «Man in the Modern Science». They respected one another intellectually as well as personally. (*Ibid*; Cf. Michaël de Saint-Cheron, «Levinas et le pape Jean-Paul II,» *Cités*, No. 50, Extrêmes violences (2012), downloaded from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23270229> [accessed: 09/11/2019], pp. 157-160). With Gabriel Marcel, Lorda wrote that Marcel's main conception of the distinction between 'Being' and 'Having' has a fundamental importance in the Second Vatican Council as well as the thought of John Paul II. The person only reveals himself in the personalist and communitarian universe, but never in the materialistic civilization, objectification and one-dimensional world. (Juan Luis Lorda, *Antropología cristiana del Concilio Vaticano II a Juan Pablo II*, p. 45; Cf. Belén Blesa, «Marcel y Wojtyła: Un diálogo a posteriori,» in Juan Manuel Burgos (ed.), *La filosofía personalista de Karol Wojtyła*, p. 344-355).

of dialogue before he was elected as Pope John Paul II, and he put that idea into a lively dialogue with a theological perspective in his writings and actions during his papacy.

2.1. *Wojtyła's Idea of Dialogue in the Person and Act and Some Writings before His Papacy*

In the *Person and Act*, Wojtyła mentions that there are the authentic attitudes in participation which lead the person together with the others toward the common good of the community, namely, solidarity and opposition. The essence of solidarity is person's readiness to involve actively in the common action for his own self-realization as well as the realization of the common good of the community. That person is always ready to take a share with others in the process of acting together as well as in sharing the result of acting together for the goodness of each other and for the common good. In such attitude of solidarity, there may also be a free decision to sacrifice or actualize a self-giving for the goodness of others and the common good. On the other hand, the opposition itself cannot be considered as an absolute opponent of solidarity because the opposition fundamentally consists of the same sense as solidarity. It just manifests different ways or forms from those of solidarity, but its core is still participation to achieve the common good of the community. The Cracovian philosopher asserts that solidarity and opposition are complementary so both has to be harmoniously lived in the community and make all efforts to reach the common good of the community become more lived and dynamic. For this reason, according to Wojtyła, both solidarity and opposition have to adhere the principles of dialogue.³⁷ We may then, at least, understand here that the principles of dialogue consist of some key principles that make solidarity and opposition which fundamentally have the same spirit but manifest it in the different ways, embrace and become stronger to realize the common good of the community. Dialogue in this sense, therefore, does never intend to seek uniformity and conformity or even to eliminate all differences, but it really reveals the openness and acceptance to live in a dynamic situation, and sometimes also any tensions, between various differences while

³⁷ PA, p. 412; AP, p. 287.

still looking together for the realization of the common good of the community. He also adds,

The principle of dialogue allows us to select and bring to light what in controversial situations is right and true, and helps to eliminate any partial, preconceived or subjective views and trends. Such views and inclinations may become the seed of strife and conflict between men, while what is right and true always favors the development of the person and enriches the community. Dialogue, in fact, without evading the strains, the conflicts, or the strife manifest in the life of various human communities takes up what is right and true in these differences, what may become a source of good for men.³⁸

From those considerations, it can be resumed that the sense of dialogue in Wojtyła's thought should be considered in three inseparable approaches because they are bound with Wojtyła's personalistic vision based on the framework of the dynamic correlation of person and action. Those approaches are the anthropological approach which can explain the fundamental foundations of dialogue in the structure of human relation and of community, the epistemological approach which can explore the relation between dialogue and the man's searching for the truth in the middle of controversy and conflict of interests, and the ethical approach which can draw how a dialogue leads the persons and the community toward the true, the right, the just, or we simply call, the common good for the certain community, for all human communities, or even for the entire humanity.

2.1.1. Dialogue in Its Basic Personalistic Foundation

It is clear that dialogue in Wojtyła's thought as well as in some philosophers mentioned earlier happens in the realm of human intersubjectivity. Wojtyła has different way to explain intersubjectivity because he approaches it by still considering his analysis of the dynamic correlation between person and the action.³⁹ He considers intersubjectivity in his theory of participation.

³⁸ PA, p. 412; AP, p. 287.

³⁹ In the international symposium held by the KUL in 1970 to discuss some problems on Wojtyła's work *Person and Act*, there was objections proposed by Fr. Kuc about Wojtyła's approach on the intersubjectivity or the relationship of persons. For them, it is human relation which has to be

Participation has two inseparable significations. Firstly, participation is an innermost and homogeneous property of the man-person who exists, lives, and consequently acts together with the others. In other words, the man as a person can never be considered a solitary or an isolated being. Without ceasing to be himself, the man-person exists and acts together with other, manifests the personalistic value and hence, attains his self-realization, mutually shares those with other through a common action, and at the same time, actively contributes to realize the common good. This truth is asserted much more by the second sense of participation by that which the man-person is capable to take a share into the humanity of other. By humanity of other, Wojtyła refers not to an abstract idea of humanity, but a concrete humanity which is manifested by myself as well as by other self.

In those senses, participation explicitly reveals the openness, acceptance, and affirmation of otherness. I am indeed different from other, and my existence is neither formed nor determined, neither by other nor by my relationship with other. I am really autonomous with all my unique and unrepeatable consciousness and experiences. I can, however, understand the other as he or she really is, in so far as the other is, for me, an I or another I. As an I, the other

considered as a basic anthropological approach because it is more decisive factor in the human development than the dynamic correlation between the person and the action. Wojtyła answered that Fr. Kuc was right when said that theory of participation is insufficient, but the Cracovian philosopher then pointed that the argumentation of Fr. Kuc deviated from his work *Person and Act* in three central points: the understanding of the notion of participation, the simplification of the problem of the interpersonal relationship, and the idea of human dynamism. He said that he concerned about emphasizing the importance of person's ability to act with others, through which person can manifest his personalistic value, thus obtains his self-realization, because there are various anti-personalistic tendencies of the contemporary life and various concepts of the common good which opposes to the true good of the person. He then more strongly underlined the understanding of a dynamic correlation of the person with action in order to obtain the correct understanding of a dynamic relationship between the persons. It seems that Wojtyła sees that the correlation of the person and the action is methodologically more fundamental than the relationship of person-to-person because that correlation reveals the relation of «being» and «acting» as it was expressed in the principle of *operari sequitur esse*. The man experiences the reality of being and acting as a subject or an agent and, at the same time, experiences and understands them in himself as an object. For this reason, Wojtyła reaffirms that it is necessary to understand completely the dynamic correlation between person and the action so that it is more clearly and distinctly our understanding on the dynamic relationship of persons. (See. Karol Wojtyła, «Afterword to the Discussion on Person and Act,» in Karol Wojtyła, *Person and Act and Related Essays Volume 1*, p. 451-452; Krzysztof Guzowski, «El Personalismo de Comunion en Karol Wojtyła,» in Juan Manuel Burgos (ed.), *La filosofía personalista de Karol Wojtyła*, Madrid: Biblioteca Palabra, 2007, p. 198)

has his or her own dynamic as same as my own dynamic as a person. The other also manifests his or her own personalistic value or dignity through the action, and by realizing an action, the other could fully obtain his or her self-realization. The other is not a barrier for me to manifest my personalistic values and achieve my own self-realization through the realization of an action, but the existence of the other is always like a gift for me to manifest the personalistic values and achieve self-realization of each other through the realization of existing and acting together. Therefore, openness, acceptance and affirmation of the existence of other would be fully actualized if I and the other share together our concrete humanity without any border as it is said in the Gospel's Commandment of Love. It may happen also because, thanks to the personal structure of self-possession, every person fundamentally possesses himself so he is able to offer self-giving to each other for the good.

Moreover, participation is also, according to Wojtyła, a constitutive element of human community, both the community of existing or co-existence as well as the community of acting or co-operation. In his personalistic vision, even though community is an accidental reality, it has its fullest signification if it is fundamentally considered as a unity of the specific multiplicity of personal subjects through participation.⁴⁰ Community itself has two inseparable dimensions, namely, the interpersonal dimension which is represented in «I-thou» relationship and the social dimension which is represented in «We» relationship.⁴¹

In the I-thou relationship, Wojtyła underlines that a thou is always someone, a person. A thou is thus an I, another I. He rejects the idea that I is formed in a certain way by a thou in which the reality of thou and the relationship of I-thou is considered as a prior reality to the reality of the I, as it has been considered by some thinkers such as Buber or Marcel. He insists that it is impossible to understand a thou and the relationship of I-thou without firstly understanding the I because thou is fundamentally an I or another I. I can understand the interiority of a thou by analyzing my own interiority and my personal structures until finally I am able to understand a thou and its interiority as another I.⁴² In thinking or speaking of a thou, he said, «I express a relation

⁴⁰ Karol Wojtyła, «The Person: Subject and Community,» p. 237.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 240-252

⁴² See also. Juan Manuel Burgos, *Para comprender a Karol Wojtyła*, p. 71; Juan Manuel Burgos Velasco, «El personalisme de Karol Wojtyła: persona, prójimo, comunidad, sociedad,» in *Horyzonty*

that somehow proceeds from me (my own I) but also return to me (my own I)».⁴³ In this sense, a thou always expresses not only a clear distinction and separation from me, but also a connection with me. In a broader sense, therefore, I can apply the term thou to one of other persons, to anyone who is a really concrete person, but I cannot apply it to many persons. To many persons, we have to use term «we». He then says, «When two people mutually become an I and a thou for each other and experience their relation in this manner, only then, it seem to me, do we observe character of the community proper to an interpersonal I-thou relationship...as a basis for analyzing the participation...as participation in the very humanity of another human being.»⁴⁴ In this I-thou relationship, Wojtyła thinks of an authentic interpersonal community regardless of its forms and varieties, where there is a potentiality to obtain a mutual transcendent value of person or person's dignity through their (*I and thou*) actions. He adds that only such relationship is a *communio personarum*.⁴⁵

Wojtyła thinks of the important distinction between «I-thou» and «We» regarding a number of various forms of community. «I-thou» indirectly refers to the unity of persons joined in a specific relation (one + one), and directly refers to persons themselves. On the other hand, «We» directly refers to the unity of many persons, but indirectly to the persons who establish that specific unity. «We» is thus primarily considered as a set of persons which can be a society or a group which is not a substantial reality, but the accidental because it is built from a relationship between persons. Wojtyła asserts that «We» relationship reveals the social dimension of community.

Wojtyła also realizes that he prefers to choose the term of «We» than of «they». For him, a community always concerned of the men as the personal subjects so every member is the «I» and the «thou», not merely «he» or «she» because «he» or «she» associates with the man as an object, and so does «they». Therefore, as the equivalent of «I» and «thou», Wojtyła chooses to

Polityki, vol. 7, No. 19 (2016), DOI: 10.17399/HP.2016.071901., p. 25-26; Cf. Julia Urabayen, «Emmanuel Lévinas y Karol Wojtyła: Dos comprensiones de la persona y una misma defensa del ser humano,» in *Persona y Derecho*, vol. 56*(2007), ISSN 0211-4526, p. 409-442; Cf. Josep M. Coll, «Karol Wojtyła entre las filosofías de la persona y el personalismo diálogo,» in Juan Manuel Burgos (ed.), *La filosofía personalista de Karol Wojtyła*, Madrid: Biblioteca Palabra, 2007, p. 212-220.

⁴³ Karol Wojtyła, «The Person: Subject and Community», p. 241.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 243.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 246.

use the pronoun «We» because «We» refers not only to many people, many subjects, many «I>s, but also refers to the unique subjectivity of this unity which will not be found in «they».⁴⁶

If «We» is many «I>s, it can be understood through its action. A «We» consists of many personal subjects who in some way exist and act together. By acting together, it must not be considered as a number of activities which are performed along side by side, but as a certain activity which is performed together by many personal subjects to achieve a value that gathers and bonds them, namely, the common good. Therefore, the relationship of many persons which are bound with a certain value called the common good, seems to be the heart of any kind of the social community. In the common good, the persons are ready to take a share and establish a specific unity of «We». The common good which is a main reason for the persons to unite into a «We», according to Wojtyła, has to be based on its principal reference to the truth and to a «true» good.⁴⁷

The dynamics of the interpersonal «I-thou» relationship and of the social «We» relationship are also different, but it is undeniable that both also make the community more dynamic. In the dynamics of the community, it could be clearly seen that the strains, frictions, or even conflicts sometimes happen because in the very essential core of the community, there are the persons with their unique and unrepeatable personal subjectivity who are mutually bound one another in the dynamic relationship. There is also some certain situations in which someone (an I) decide not to involve or to contribute in any kind of the common action; some also take a part into the common action but they do not manifest their personalistic value in their action or they just act together for a conformist reason. Both forms called the non-authentic attitudes should also be considered as the problems that have to be solved in that dynamic community.

Wojtyła finally explains his idea of participation by noting that participation entails with the reference system of existing and acting together. For him, the first reference system is the fact that the man-person is always a member of a particular community, and it could happen that a person may, at the same time, be a member of several communities. As a member of a certain commu-

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 247.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 249.

nity or communities, a man-person exists and acts together with the others who are also member of such community. In this case, he makes participation actualize in a particular community because he is a member of that community and the others with whom he actualizes participation, are also the member of that community like him. In this sense, the man may be closer to his fellows of the same community than anyone else outside that community so it could be said that his realization of participation is limited in a certain community. On contrary, the second reference system is broader and more fundamental than the first, that is, the system of neighbour. In this case, a man-person presents himself as a neighbour to other and also treats the other as his neighbour. The notion of neighbour in Wojtyła's thought is strictly related to all man-persons as such and it is important to treat and value the person regardless of any borders.⁴⁸ The notion covers all men which are considered only in their humanness or their dignity. He asserts that all forms of participation in the community are rooted and discover its fundamental personal significant in the system of neighbour.

⁴⁸ It is very clear that this idea of neighbor is inspired by the evangelical messages. It is not surprising that Wojtyła later related the participation to the actualization of the Commandment of love, both in the *Person and Act* as well as in the other two articles. (Cf. Juan Manuel Burgos, «El personalismo de Karol Wojtyła: persona, prójimo, comunidad, sociedad,» in *Horyzonty Polityki*, vol. 7, No. 19(2016), p. 30-31). He then mentioned more clearly in his Apostolic Letter «*Salvifici Doloris*» that the notion of neighbour relates to the parable of the Good Samaritan (Luk 10: 25-37). The main emphasis of that parable is not looking for an answer to the question who is my neighbor, but how I should be a good neighbor, especially to those who suffer. He said, «The Good Samaritan of Christ's parable does not stop at sympathy and compassion alone. They become for him an incentive to actions aimed at bringing help to the injured man. In a word, then, a Good Samaritan is *one who brings help in suffering*, whatever its nature may be. Help which is, as far as possible, effective. He puts his whole heart into it, nor does he spare material means. We can say that he gives himself, his very «I», opening this «I» to the other person. Here we touch upon one of the key-points of all Christian anthropology. Man cannot «fully find himself except through a sincere gift of himself». A Good Samaritan is *the person capable of exactly such a gift of self.*» (*Salvifici Doloris*, 26). It is also necessary to say that participation always needs to be expressed not only in internal disposition to the others, but also in the external action to the others. In this point we can say that the Christian attitude in the face of suffering never passive, but is certainly active. Suffering then is also present in order «to unleash love in the human person, that unselfish gift of one's «I» on behalf of the other people, especially those who suffer». (*Salvifici Doloris*, 29) This idea of responsibility for the neighbour especially those who suffer has the similar echo with the idea of the face of other on Levinas' thought even though both thinkers have different manner to elaborate their distinctive ideas. (Cf. Julia Urabayen, «Emmanuel Levinas y Karol Wojtyła: El ser humano como ser intersubjetivo,» in Juan Manuel Burgos (ed.), *La filosofía personalista de Karol Wojtyła*, Madrid: Biblioteca Palabra, 2007, p. 250)

It can thus be resumed that dialogue within participation could be defined as that which supports and guarantees the realization of participation in every level of human relationship, i.e., the interpersonal «I-thou» relationship, the «We» relationship, and the participation respecting to the system of a member of a certain community as well as to the system of neighbour. Every level has its particular dynamic so it would also make dialogue more dynamic and particular in every level.

Moreover, it seems that such dialogue is characterized by the same principles or virtues: 1) openness, acceptance, and affirmation of another person as an I, as another I or thou for me and also as a neighbour to me, 2) mutuality or reciprocity, 3) unity or a communion bound by the common good; 4) solidarity, including the opposition, or a readiness to join with the other in the common action and in a contribution to the community for the good of each member and the common good; 5) directedness to the truth and the true good, 6) a consideration that any tension, friction, and conflict are not something to evade, but, in turn, may be the constitutive elements to dynamize participation; 7) rejection of the non-authentic attitudes of conformity and non-involvement

2.1.2. Dialogue as A Path of Searching Together for the Truth

a. *Man Searches for the Truth*

It is undeniable that Wojtyła follows the Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrines about the truth as a correspondence between human intellect and reality, *adequatio intellectus et rei*⁴⁹, and about human natural inclination to the truth.⁵⁰ This truth is bound with the human knowledge of the entire reality. The knowledge is not a set of things or facts, but it is indeed a human comprehension of the reality as a whole.⁵¹ In it, the man can believe that he is capable of conforming, adapting and developing himself through the action in his world. Thus, without such truth, the man cannot effectively act in this real world.

⁴⁹ St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate*, I, 1; Karol Wojtyła, «The Problem of Experience in Ethics,» in Karol Wojtyła, *Person and Community*, p. 116-117.

⁵⁰ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, 1.

⁵¹ Cf. Miguel Acosta and Adrian J. Reimers, *Karol Wojtyła's Personalist Philosophy*, p. 67-68.

Wojtyła was interested much more in Thomistic doctrines which disclose the connection between the reason and the will respecting to the truth and the good. Every human act tends itself not only toward a good, but a true good since between freedom which is manifestation of the will as self-determination, and the reason closely work together and thus cannot be separated (*utraque ad actum alterius operator*).⁵² On the one hand, the will wills so the reason knows, and on the other hand, the reason knows that the will wills and also knows what the will truly wills. Therefore, both the reason and the will include one another. When the reason sees that the will wills a certain good, and when the reason knows that something is good, such good would be the object of the reason, and that object would be a particular truth. On contrary, the truth is the good of the reason and the truth is also the ultimate end of the will which urges the reason to the truth.⁵³

In the presence of the reason, the good has both theoretical and practical sense. It has a theoretical sense because the reason by a speculative way defines its essence and reflects the principles that play role in it. It also has a practical sense when the reason discloses it as the object of an action.⁵⁴ Wojtyła compares the man's capacity to know the good with the other creature's capacity. The other creature can indeed urge itself toward a particular good, even such good is, in a certain sense, also aimed by the man through his action. However, thanks to the role of the reason, the man can know the essence of the good to which he aims. Among the good which he could gain by his action, it may be found that there is a hierarchy of the good which reveals the lower or the higher level of good in accordance with a certain measure respecting to the Supreme Good. Here, the reason can recognize such measure because the reason can know the very essence of the good.

The good itself, according to St. Thomas, is an analogical concept which covers all good which is generally an object of the will. The reason can apprehend not only the different objects of the will, but also can point the distinc-

⁵² Cf. Karol Wojtyła, «On the Directive or Subservient Role of Reason in Ethics: in the Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, David Hume, and Immanuel Kant,» in Karol Wojtyła, *Person and Community*, p. 58; Cf. Karol Wojtyła, «On the Metaphysical and Phenomenological Basis of the Moral Norm: In the Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and Max Scheler,» in Karol Wojtyła, *Person and Community*, p. 80.

⁵³ Karol Wojtyła, «On the Metaphysical and Phenomenological Basis of the Moral Norm,» p. 80.

⁵⁴ Karol Wojtyła, «On the Directive or Subservient Role of Reason in Ethics,» p. 58; Cf. Karol Wojtyła, «On the Metaphysical and Phenomenological Basis of the Moral Norm,» p. 80.

tions among those objects. St. Thomas makes three distinctions of the good, such as: *bonum honestum*, *bonum utile*, and *bonum delectabile*. This distinction is, according to Wojtyła, defined by the structure of the human activity, and it was introduced by Aristotle, then it had been creatively developed by St. Thomas who concerned not only about the structure of human activity, but also about the distinctive characteristics of each good. In general, *bonum honestum* refers to the good as an end, whereas *bonum utile* points out a means to attain an end. These types of the good are also distinguished from *bonum delectabile* which is a «subjective good of satisfaction or pleasure.»⁵⁵ If those former goods correspond to the will in its connection with the reason, the latter is rather a good which flows from the passivity of the will or the other appetitive faculties.

Furthermore, St. Thomas posits the reason plays a superior role in human life than the other faculties because it directly manifests human dignity as a rational being. The principal discourse on the types of the goods cannot be separated from its conformity with the role of the reason. *Bonum honestum* is prior to any normative functions although it is also immediate basis for them. In itself, *bonum honestum* refers to a good which conforms with human nature as a rational being because it still defines what human being desires for himself. *Bonum delectabile*, in turn, refers to a satisfaction or a pleasure whose sensory characteristics does not directly point out human perfection as a rational being. Finally, *bonum utile* which is always apprehended as a means to gain an end, may be directed toward *bonum honestum* which means that it is bound with the correspondence to the role of the reason, or toward *bonum delectabile* which means that it is conformed with the sensory satisfaction or pleasure. In the one hand, if it is directed to *bonum honestum*, *bonum utile* can thus be called «a true *bonum utile*» or «a true means toward an end» because it is compatible with the true and ultimate end which human being can reach by the power of his reason. In the other hand, if it is directed to *bonum delectabile*, *bonum utile* can only be a mere tool to obtain a partial good.

Therefore, Wojtyła says, «The search for means to an end takes place on a level compatible with our human dignity only when that end conforms to our rational nature.»⁵⁶ He also adds that in the Thomistic doctrines, sa-

⁵⁵ Karol Wojtyła, «On the Directive or Subservient Role of Reason in Ethics,» p. 58.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

tisfaction or pleasure is not only a domain of the senses because the man who leads himself toward *bonum honestum* through «a true *bonum utile*» can also experience a perfect satisfaction or pleasure, that is, a satisfaction which comes not from the power of the human sense, but indeed from the power of human rationality, from which the man in its fullest perfection is a rational being.⁵⁷

The close relationship between the truth and the good is bound as well as the relationship between two human faculties, that is, the reason and the will. The truth is always an essential object of the reason whereas the good is that of the will. Since the will is human faculty which St. Thomas calls as *appetitus rationalis*, the human reason which corresponds to the will, ultimately has to find the truth that which is willed by the will in every act of will. The action itself is the extent of the act of existence according to the principle of *operari sequitur esse*. Therefore, all of human existence is continuously actualized in this conjunction with the truth, and it is really essential and unavoidable in the human life since it flows from the human nature. The function of the truth in human action and existence is, therefore the very essence of the moral norms which St. Thomas considers the good formally as well as existentially.⁵⁸

This idea cannot be separated from Thomistic doctrine of human spiritual life both in general and particular sense. The essence of spiritual life according to the reason is the truth, especially the truth in all those which are the objects of the will. The object of the will itself is always the good. The essence of spiritual life is, therefore, the truth of the good. As a result, the essence of the moral life is not just the 'lived experience' of the value (or even the good), but precisely the 'lived experience' of the truth of the good that is an object of the action and that is realized in the action.⁵⁹

For that reason, when Wojtyła analyzes the correlation between person and action, he always asserts that person manifests his personalistic value in and through the action so when he performs an action, he fully realizes himself. This self-realization, Wojtyła argues, cannot be separated from its correspondence to the good, or more precisely, the true good which refers to *bonum honestum* and the «true bonum utile». ⁶⁰ Without it, there would not be self-realization in the fully sense through human action.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 91.

⁶⁰ Cf. Karol Wojtyła, «The Person: Subject and Community,» p. 249.

b. *Searching Together for Truth through Dialogue within Participation*

The correlation of person and action is also applied as a basic framework for understanding the intersubjective relationship. In both interpersonal and social dimensions, the persons perform a common action through which they still manifest their personalistic value and thus reach their own self-realization, and also manifest their unity and try to actualize the common good for each of them and for the community. As a person directs himself or herself toward the true of the good through his or her personal action, the persons within interpersonal and social relationships direct themselves to the true good of each person and the community through a common action.

The main problem that then emerges is that this common searching for the true good is never easy effort. Every community consists of the multiple free persons who naturally have ability to incline themselves to the true good. However, it can easily be imagined that each of them has different level of that ability which depend on various factors, both the internal and the external factors so that each of them by his very lived experience could understand the reality and the meaning of the true good. They can also choose to express and manifest all his understandings in some various ways. In other words, due to the multiplicity of the persons with their complexity and richness in the community, it is never easy to unify or synchronize them in the common action for the true good of the community, that is, the true common good. Even though each person is aware of his existing and acting together with other through participation, and of the importance of the common good as a constitutive element of his or her community, it is still difficult to bring that awareness into a practice in the reality of community, and it may emerge a tension, a friction or even a conflict.

c. *Some Required Attitudes for Searching Together for the Truth through Dialogue*

Dialogue thus becomes an opportunity that brings the persons together to think and act together for the common good. Such dialogue can only take place when, first of all, as a free being, each person in the community is aware of and believe in human capacity to recognize and direct himself or herself to the truth and the true good. Love for the truth is an essential element because the truth clearly transcends all subjective opinions, tendencies and

dispositions. The differences in the opinions, tendencies and subjective dispositions are often seen as a part of the historical and cultural identity that have shaped one's identity. Through dialogue, Wojtyła believes that the truth can be revealed and can also illuminate the process of dialogue because the culture is, above all, understood as a result of the actions of the personal subjects.⁶¹ Through this dialogue, each person actualizes his participation in the humanity of his fellow man, namely, the concrete humanity of other person as such, even though all the distinctive identities attached to him.

If each person really shows a love for the truth, he would also posit and consider other persons with all their rich personalistic values or their dignity as a truth which must be respected more than all other objective reality. Respect for other in its wholeness as a person, that is, as he or she really is, as same as the respect to his or her dignity, is thus not something that is forced to accept, but it comes by nature as a free human being who searches for and loves the truth, and the loveable truth now concretely presents in its fullness, in the presence of another person who stands, lives, acts in front of or beside

⁶¹ In his argument, Wojtyła convinces that culture is shaped through the human praxis. However, inspired by the explanation of *Gaudium et Spes* about culture, he considers the idea of human praxis in the framework of the dynamic correlation of person and action so it is important for him to profoundly understand that the man as a personal subject is the only subject who shapes the culture, lives and grows up within it, and continuously develops himself and the culture being more humane. In the culture, therefore, the primary priority is always, in the metaphysical senses as well as the pre-axiological, the person who acts in this world. By the metaphysical sense, human act is the extent of his existence in the world. Whereas by the pre-axiological sense, human act is always considered as that through which the man manifests his personalistic value and thus fully realizes himself, and at the same time, makes the non-human reality around him be more humane. In other word, human praxis through which the culture is established can never be reduced only in a mere economical point of view (only about the productions, distributions and consumption) or in the utilitarian vision which reduce anything including the human praxis, even the person who is truly a subject of the praxis only as a valuable instruments or tools if they are useful. It is important for Wojtyła to posit human praxis through which the culture is developed, in the spiritual framework, especially that which has been believed and lived by the Christianity for the ages. There is always a close relationship between *actio et contemplatio*. Only in this way, the culture which is established and developed through human praxis can always make the person experience a wonder and an awe of the reality, extent and strengthen the senses of cosmos, both of macrocosmos and of microcosmos, deepen our understanding of the order of the universe, etc. The culture, therefore, becomes a home for the man where through his action he finds out the richness, the depth, the extent of reality in its relation with truth, goodness, and beauty, and finally with his Creator. In this idea of culture, it is not too difficult to see that, albeit its diversity, all cultures consider the person with his or her action as the only subject of the culture (Karol Wojtyła, «The Problem of the Constitution of Culture through Human Praxis,» p. 263-275)

or next to me. Each of them has the same sense of obligation and responsibility within his or her personal subjectivity, not only for themselves, but also for other so the truth and the man's love for the truth always guide every person to search for a true common good for their community.⁶²

The love for the truth and the mutual respect for each other encourages each individual person to be ready to sit and talk together, listen to each other as they really are, ask each other questions, explain each other, see and evaluate together the problems they faced, examine together the prejudices and the assumptions of the subjective opinions, tendencies or dispositions that may prevent the individuals from seeing clearly the truth and showing the sincere respect for other. All these common actions have an important and fundamental aim, that is, a mutual understanding and respect one another as they really are. All diversities within the community are thus never being a barrier to get together in the common actions, nor are considered as something to be avoided. By engaging a dialogue based on the love for truth which provokes a mutual respect for each other, each person freely determines and attempts to obtain together some certain common goods for which he or she is bound with the others. This mutual understanding and respect precede any form of consensus or agreement because the persons with their personalistic value in the common action are fundamentally much more valuable. The consensus and the agreements are nothing more than a fruit of a long process that is carried out sincerely, honestly, diligently and patiently through a dialogue.

In addition to the personal attitudes, a dialogue also presupposes a certain social structure or system. Wojtyła places his idea of dialogue in the *Person and Act* specifically within the framework of participation to realize together the common good of the community. As it was previously explained, Wojtyła reveals that there are the social systems that do not let participation emerge and develop, namely, the individualism and the totalism (collectivism). Both of these systems have a basic erroneous understanding of human person. For them, human being is an isolated individual so the social system that is established has to provide a free space for each individual to achieve self-interest (individualism) or, on contrary it has to fundamentally neglect the individual freedom by legitimizing the supremacy of society with all its common interests over the individuals (totalism). Dialogue is thus only possible if the

⁶² Cf. PA, p. 255-257; AP, p. 173-174.

social or government system or the system of the international relations is a personalistic system respecting to the fundamental truth that human being is a person with all his or her dignity. Therefore, the systems always have a responsibility to defend human dignity. To obtain a true understanding of the man and his dignity as a person, again, dialogue is a way that should be taken.

2.1.3. Dialogue as A Path toward the Good for Human Communities

a. *Acting Together and the Common Good*

Every person is always a member of a certain community. One may, at the same time, be a member of some diverse communities. One is a son who is a member of a certain family; he is also a member of a certain neighbourhood, of a certain friendship community, of the labour union, etc. All those communities live together in the rich and complex fabric of a society.⁶³

The common good is thus a transition key from the interpersonal dimension of «I-Thou» to the social dimension of «We».⁶⁴ In the common good, without ceasing to be itself, «I» and «thou» consciously and freely enter into a new reality of «We» through a participation. The encounter between multiplicity of the persons, of the «I»s, constitutes a reality of «We» bound by the common good through participation. Wojtyła then gives an example of the reality of matrimony and family.⁶⁵ The matrimony is always an interpersonal bond of a man and a woman to love and enrich each other by actualizing a mutual self-giving for the entire of their lives without ceasing to be a unique man and woman. Such interpersonal relationship then enters into a new dimension

⁶³ In the *Person and Act*, Wojtyła was not really interested in a strictly distinction between community and society because he concerned rather about the community membership than in the associational relationship. He just mentioned that society is a number of the mutual complementary communities. (PA, p. 401-402; AP, p. 278-279). In his article *The Person: Subject and Community*, he wrote a little bit longer about this distinction. He did not deny that the term community and society are simply considered as an interchangeable term. A community, according to him, is not a simply society, and society is not simply a community. He said, «... one could say that a society (a social group, etc.) is what it is by virtue of the community of its members. Community, therefore, seems to be the more essential reality, at least from the point of view of the personal subjectivity of all the members of a given society or social group.» (Karol Wojtyła, «The Person: Subject and Community,» p. 239)

⁶⁴ Cf. Sergio Lozano Arco, *La interpersonalidad en Karol Wojtyła*, Valencia: Edicep, 2016, p. 277.

⁶⁵ Karol Wojtyła, «The Person: Subject and Community,» p. 247-248; Cf. Sergio Lozano Arco, *La interpersonalidad en Karol Wojtyła*, p. 278.

of the relationship, that is, the social dimension of matrimony which refers to a family whose ends are not only for each of them, but also for their unity and for their children, even broader, that is, for their community and society.

The common good becomes, therefore, a binder of the community because the social relationship between persons in the community leads to some good which can be achieved through the common action. The concept of common good itself is not an easy concept to define firmly. Because there are various types of the social configuration, Wojtyła writes that the common good is an analogical concept which can be well understood according to its context by which it is applied.⁶⁶ He is clearly not the only philosopher to outline his views on the common good. Wojtyła's view, however, does not go far from the Thomistic view which at least discusses the common good in the dynamic relationship between person and community or society, and in a creative tension between the personal good and the common good.⁶⁷

In the light of Thomistic view, Wojtyła stands on some fundamental considerations to understand the common good. Firstly, he emphasizes the primacy of person in regard with human relation or community. It is profoundly important and necessary to understand the community from its fundamental reality, that is, the real personal subject, not vice versa. Secondly, the concept

⁶⁶ Juan Manuel Burgos Velasco, «El personalisme de Karol Wojtyła: persona, prójimo, comunidad, sociedad,» p. 29.

⁶⁷ There are some important principles in Thomistic view on the discourse of common good. The aim of society is the act of virtue of all its members. This act of virtue of all its members has two conditions. First, they act according to the virtue because the virtue causes them to live well. Second, the sufficiency of the physical goodness that is useful for carrying out the virtuous actions. For living by virtue, freedom is principally required because the humans are naturally ready to achieve the best virtue, but there are still individuals who have a tendency to evil or bad things. Therefore, to ensure peaceful unity and keep individuals away from the evil, a legal juridical action can be carried out so that it directs all to the virtue. In the tension between the common good and the individual good, it must be noted that the common good is seen as a superior to the individual good. (Cf. Sergio Lozano Arco, *La interpersonalidad en Karol Wojtyła*, p. 261-263).

In general, Wojtyła's view on the objective dimension of common good is the same as St. Thomas' view. For Wojtyła, the common good is an objective and concrete aim of a certain community. The common good can make the diverse references for the families, nations or all mankind. For that reason, the common good is not a univocal nor equivocal, but it is an analogical concept. Nevertheless, Wojtyła sees that such definition is too superficial because it cannot explain and express the subjects' dynamics within the community who acts together to obtain the good for them, both for the individual as well as the community. In other word, such definition is lack of a deep consideration of the subjective dimension of community. (Cf. PA, p. 404-406; AP, p. 280-282; Cf. Karol Wojtyła, «The Person: Subject and Community,» p. 249-250)

of common good is an analogical concept because it cannot be applied to all diverse communities and it cannot explain well the fact that the personal subject is really dynamic and so is the community, and the fact that someone can be a member of some certain communities at the same moment. Thirdly, the common good is simply not a sum or a generalization of the individual goods, but it is really the good which is valuable to gain for all members of that community. Fourthly, the common good has both the objective and the subjective dimension⁶⁸, and the subjective dimension of common good can be

⁶⁸ It should be understood that before Wojtyła, there was Maritain who thinks of subjective dimension of the common good. Maritain notes in *The Person and the Common Good* which had been firstly published in 1946, that there is a correlation between the person as a social unit and the common good as the end of the society. The common good as the end of society is the good of the community, of the social body, neither the individual goal nor a collection of the individual goals. However, the common good has to reach not only the social body as the error of a totalitarian system, but it has to be received in the persons, in each one of whom is a mirror of the whole social body. It is really the good or a good living for the multitude persons. The most important thing in the common good is that it requires a recognition of the fundamental rights of the persons and of the type of society in which the domestic society where the persons are primitively engaged, is totally different from the political society. (cf. Jacques Maritain, *The Person and the Common Good*, translated by John J. Fitzgerald, Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972, p. 49-50.).

For Burgos, Maritain's idea of the common good has gone beyond the classical Thomistic idea because he added the subjective dimension of the common good in which he links the person and its personality to the society. (Juan Manuel Burgos, *Para comprender a Jacques Maritain*, Salamanca: Fundación Emmanuel Mounier, 2006, p. 154). The common good of the political society is not only a set of the objective dimensions of the commodities and services (e.g.: infrastructures, schools, public spheres, fiscal condition, military power, judicial institutions, etc.), but also the subjective dimensions which are something more profound, more concrete, more humane, such as a civic conscience, the political virtues, liberty, the spiritual riches, justice, virtues, heroism, a happiness for all its members, etc. They all constitute the good human life of the multitude.

For Maritain, thus, the common good is always an essential element toward the maximum possible development of the persons which is able to be obtained not by force, but by a justice. (Cf. Jacques Maritain, *The Person and the Common Good*, p. 54) He thus thinks that the common good has twofold character: on the one hand, the common good implies that the whole persons are engaged in it and they commit their lives there. On the other hand, the common good links to the idea of a perfect society.

Furthermore, Maritain bases his thought of the common good on his interpretation of the distinction between individuality and personality in the Thomistic tradition. In brief, the individuality refers to the human materiality or the corporeality which tends to the egocentrism and the possession oriented whereas the personality refers to the spiritual dimension of the human being centered on the human intellect and the free will. As a person who has the ultimate end in God, that is, beyond any kind of the material end, the man also establishes a society through which he also desires to reach this ultimate end. When a society is a multiplicity of the persons who has both the individuality and the personality, according to Maritain, the human society can

understood through the idea of participation. By asserting that the common good of community also has the subjective dimension, Wojtyła reminds that the common good is not only a matter of objective ends, but also a matter of the manifestation of personalistic value and self-realization of each member through the common actions. The acting together, therefore, for Wojtyła, aims not only to the common good in the objective dimension, but also to the realization of the subjective moment. The common good thus reveals the true participation

b. *Living Together within Lively Tension between the person and community*

There is also an important issue in which the idea of person's primacy in respect to the community seems to be contradictory with the idea of superiority of common good over the individual good.⁶⁹ Wojtyła argues that the common good is considered as superior over the individual good not because of its quantity, but primarily because of a particular feature of the person in participation. When the person performs an action, he manifests himself, reveals his personalistic value in the action, and reaches his self-re-

be considered between two poles: 1) a society of the persons who are the material individuals; 2) a perfect communion between the persons and God in the eternal life. All the terrestrial good of society is, on the one hand, superior to the proper good of each member, but flows back upon each of them. However, on the other hand, it is progressively an anticipation of the eternal good and the transcendent Whole (*Ibid.*, p. 59).

He finally adds, «... though the person as such is a totality, the material individual, or the person as a material individual, is a part. Whereas the person, as person or totality, requires that the common good of the temporal society flow back over it, and even transcends the temporal society by its ordination to the transcendent whole, yet the person still remains, as an individual or part, inferior and subordinated to the whole and must, as an organ of the whole, serve the common work.» (*Ibid.*, p. 70).

⁶⁹ In Thomas's thought, there is indeed a tension that has to be lived between the common good and the individual good. On the one hand, it seems clear that a political society can be said to be just if it has the realization of the human good, or respects and promotes the good of everyone because each person counts as an absolute value, as a metaphysical and a moral being. On the other hand, the more we consider the importance and absolute value of every person, the more we must consider the importance and absolute goodness of the political society on which all human beings depend, including for their unique subsistence. Therefore, this consideration leads us directly to the conclusion that the good of the person is in a conflict with the common good and that, in any definite measure, it must be considered the superiority of the common good over the good of each individual. At this point, the justice demands, at any given moment, to sacrifice some non-fundamental laws about the individual in order to save society (Cf. Sergio Lozano Arco, *La interpersonalidad en Karol Wojtyła*, p. 263-264).

alization, and so do the other persons. Without ceasing to be himself, a person exists and acts together with other in order to manifest themselves, to reach together self-realization of each other, and to direct themselves toward a certain shared common good; it also happens in other persons in the same community. In other words, by acting together with other who is person as same as he is, the man-person manifests himself and reaches his self-realization in the fullest sense, including his proper feature as a person who exists and acts together with other and enters into a concrete humanity of other. All those can only happen in the social order with the common good as its end, not in the individual order. In this sense, the common good is superior than the individual good.

In their effort toward the common good, each person develops the authentic attitudes, that is, solidarity and opposition. Those attitudes express a readiness of each person to accept and to realize their own share or part in the community to act together for the common good. Therefore, Wojtyła thinks that the man-person by participation can dynamically live within such tension between the individual good and the common good, and also between solidarity and opposition in actualizing the realization of the common good. In individualism, it is impossible to speak of the common good because the very end of the individualistic system, is the individual good. It is also impossible to understand the common good in the collectivism because all individual by coercion has to submit to the common interest which cannot always be separated from the interest of the regime. For Wojtyła, submitting to the common interest by the act of sacrifice can never be forced, but it is always an *actus personae* which manifests the personalistic value and thus will attain the true self-realization. It is a true self-giving for the other and for the community.

c. *Dialogue within An Attempt to Attain the Common Good*

Such common good is indeed a difficult and complicated end that has to be attained by all members since the community was established. There are always the challenges from various views such as individualism, utilitarianism, totalitarianism, etc. The greater quantities of the «I», the more difficult and more complicated for the community to establish the unity of «We», and of course, to reach the true common good of that community. Here, Wojtyła consider the sense of dialogue as a path which has to be taken to be closer gradually to the true common good which the community aims to.

A dialogue is primarily needed within the context of existing and acting together through participation. All members live in the dynamic tension between the individual good and the common good, between his or her own self-realization and the realization of «We». Each person within any levels of community or society should be aware that he or she has the same interior sense of responsibility for the good of other and of the community on the basis of his or her freedom. In such awareness, it should be presupposed that each person freely actualizes the participation and reveals it in the fullest sense through the common action and avoid to be a conformist or even withdrawing from any communal life. The community is, in turn, always organized in such a way neither to prevent the freedom of each member to obtain their own self-realization nor to force its members to sacrifice themselves for the sake of community.

In the light of the truth, dialogue can step-by-step guide all members of the community toward the true principles about the relationship between person and community which are always in the risk of falling into any kinds of extreme views, especially individualism and totalism, utilitarianism and materialism. In such dialogue, all members should be dare to clearly re-evaluate and re-consider all assumptions behind their views, opinions, dispositions, considerations about the good for the community. Such dialogue also encourages each person who participates in it to emerge and then develop some compatible attitudes for living together, such as: to contribute for the realization of the good of the community by actualizing solidarity which never abandon the opposition, to voluntarily sacrifice for the good of others and of the community as a form of self-realization, to realize the sympathy, empathy, respect to and acceptance of the others including their opinions, intentions, beliefs, personal goals, etc., to consider that the diversity is not a barrier but a challenge to make the unity become richer, etc.

2.2. Dialogue as John Paul II Wrote and Actualized in Some Actions during His Papacy

On his 100th anniversary of his birth, The Center for the Thought of John Paul II, a Warsaw Cultural Institution held an exhibition whose principal theme is «John Paul II as the Pope of Dialogue».⁷⁰ Pope John Paul II always

⁷⁰ See «John Paul II the Pope of Dialogue – the virtual exhibition in <https://www.britishpoles.uk/john-paul-ii-the-pope-of-dialogue-the-virtual-exhibition/>; We can see also some brief in-

believed in a dialogue not as an end, but a means to encounter face-to-face with all mankind of all cultural-religious-political-social backgrounds in all their anxiety, joy and hope of the human life. He also showed that one of the priorities of his pontifical ministry was a dialogue based on the faith of the Catholic Church by flourishing some dialogical attitudes such as the openness, honesty and, above all, sincerity and courage pursuit of the truth. He lived the dialogue in both his thoughts which can be traced in many letters, messages, homilies, speeches, etc. as well as his concrete actions.⁷¹

2.2.1. Some Writings: Dialogue as a Path toward Peace

In many occasions, John Paul II expressed his conviction that dialogue is an essential and important condition for the world peace.⁷² For him, there is no peace without a sincere and continual dialogue.⁷³ Every man and woman who desire a true peace will not stop trying to exercise the dialogical attitudes patiently and step-by-step in their families, communities, societies as well as in the relation among the nations, and avoid any forms of violence which cause human divisions and separation which make people more suffer. Indeed, it is difficult to engage a dialogue, but it does not mean that it is either impossible or utopia. It is still possible to actualize a dialogue because it is strongly rooted in human dignity as a person. Therefore, in the midst of phenomena of human life, of which are marked by the painful and sorrowful experiences which caused by human divisions and separations, conflicts, confrontations, and wars, he as a man himself and as the Supreme Pontiff many times called everyone, believers as well as non-believer who have a good will, the heads

formation from other websites: <http://polishconsulatemanchester.com/popeofdialogue/gallery/pope-of-dialogue/>; https://issuu.com/msz.gov.pl/docs/papie_dialogu_plansze_wszystkie_11.05.2020 [accessed: 01/07/2022]

⁷¹ Cf. Dominika Żukowska-Gardzińska, «Dialogue in Karol Wojtyła's Thought – Polish Perspective,» in *Fides et Ratio* 4(44) 2020, ISSN 2082-7067, p. 64.

⁷² Cf. Pope John Paul II, *Message of His Holiness Pope John Paul II for the Celebration of the Day of Peace: Dialogue for Peace, A Challenge for Our Time*, 1st Januari 1983, downloaded from https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/messages/peace/documents/hf_jp-ii_mes_19821208_xvi-world-day-for-peace.html [accessed: 12/11/2021].

⁷³ Cf. Pope John Paul II, *Message of His Holiness Pope John Paul II for the Celebration of the Day of Peace: Truth, The Power of Peace*, 1st Januari 1980, downloaded from https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/messages/peace/documents/hf_jp-ii_mes_19791208_xiii-world-day-for-peace.html [accessed: 12/11/2021].

of governments and the religious leaders for participating and contributing actively to any forms of promoting and actualizing the world peace through a sincere and continual dialogue.

a. *Sin as the Profound Root of Divisions and Conflicts between Men*

In the Apostolic Exhortation, *Reconciliatio et Paenitentia*, John Paul II asserts that the root of human division which causes many sufferings is within the man himself, in which it is considered by the Christian faith as a sin.⁷⁴ The perfect way to recover men and women from the wounds caused by any kinds of division is reconciliation and penance so that all men and women are able to receive again the God's good news of love, their nature as the children of God, and consequently, becoming brothers and sisters for each other.

In the term of reconciliation, at least, the Pope points out some senses: to mend the divisions, to heal the wounds caused by divisions, and to re-establish an essential unity. He affirms that the true reconciliation thus has to reach the very root of divisions, that is, sins.⁷⁵ Meanwhile, the term of penance should be understood in its correspondence to the term of «metanoia» so it should be considered as the inmost change of heart under the influence of God and in the perspective of His kingdom. Doing the penance, therefore, becomes authentic and effective only if it is actualized in the concrete deeds of penance which are usually related to some spiritual practices of asceticism. It means that a penance is always a conversion in which someone transforms his life by changing his heart and putting it into some concrete actions, then to the entire of his or her life as a good Christian.⁷⁶ In this sense, a penance is closely connected with reconciliation because «... reconciliation with God, with oneself, and with others overcoming that radical break which is sin... only through the interior transformation or conversion... through acts of penance.»⁷⁷

⁷⁴ Cf. Pope John Paul II, *Apostolic Exhortation «Reconciliatio et Paenitentia»*, published in December 2, 1984, art. 2, downloaded from https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_02121984_reconciliatio-et-paenitentia.html, [accessed: 12/10/2021]. (It is henceforth simply called, *Reconciliatio et Paenitentia*)

⁷⁵ *Reconciliatio et Paenitentia*, art. 3

⁷⁶ *Reconciliatio et Paenitentia*, art. 4.

⁷⁷ *Ibidem*.

John Paul II particularly mentions that dialogue is a special way by which Paul VI had also purposed the relationship between reconciliation and penance to overcome the sins.⁷⁸ For the Church, dialogue is, in a certain sense, a means and especially a way of carrying out her activities into the modern world, which leads all men and women, believers and non-believers, to a conversion and repentance in a profound renewal of their conscience and life.⁷⁹ He said, «Authentic dialogue, therefore, is aimed above all at the rebirth of individuals through interior conversion and repentance, but always with profound respect for consciences and with patience and at the step-by-step pace indispensable for modern conditions.»⁸⁰

b. *Dialogue, Peace, the Truth and Freedom*

John Paul II affirms that there is a close and inseparable relationship between dialogue, peace, the truth, and the true freedom. The true peace fundamentally requires the sincerity and the truth, whereas non-truth in various forms of lies, impartial information, hoax, sectarian propaganda, manipulation, etc., are the causes of all violence and war. He also emphasizes that one of the most fundamental non-truths is a denial to believe in the man with all his ability to reach the truth, the good and the just, and at the same time, with all his weaknesses as a sinner who really needs the grace of the salvation to overcome the evil and sins.⁸¹

The Pope also believes that the truth makes every man and woman who loves the peace, cannot stop being silent or doing nothing in the face of their brothers and sisters who suffer due to violence, injustice and war. They would try to overcome any kinds of conflicts, confrontations, divisions, and step-by-step attempt to find some adequate peaceful and plausible solutions. Dialogue is a path that can be applied for any levels of human relation between: the individuals, the social groups, the political powers in the nation, or the blocs

⁷⁸ *Reconciliatio et Paenitentia*, art. 24.

⁷⁹ *Reconciliatio et Paenitentia*, art. 25.

⁸⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁸¹ Cf. Pope John Paul II, *Message of His Holiness Pope John Paul II for the Celebration of the Day of Peace: Truth, The Power of Peace*, Januari 1st, 1980; Cf. Pope John Paul II, *Message of His Holiness Pope John Paul II for the Celebration of the Day of Peace: Dialogue for Peace, A Challenge for Our Time*, 1st Januari 1983.

of the states in the international relationship. Dialogue can also be engaged in any types of background: races, ethics, cultures, ideologies and religions. Indeed, a dialogue can be applied in almost all circumstances, thanks to its close relationship with the truth in its correspondence to the good and the just, since every man and woman, as individual or with other, naturally search for the truth and by his nature the man can recognize some elements or aspects of the truth possessed by the others, including the truth in their beliefs, their knowledge, their ways of living, thinking or acting, etc. In such way, the man demands a dialogue to strengthen all possible ways to obtain the peace.

John Paul many times particularly promoted and defended the truth of the wholeness and the dignity of human person. In his speech at the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1979, for instance, in front of many heads of the states and governments, and the leaders of the international organizations who came from many backgrounds: races, nations, political-ideological orientations, faiths and convictions, among the representatives of the conflicting nations (Argentina-Chile, some nations of the Middle East, the nations of NATO and of the Warsaw Pact), he gently asserted that he came to the Assembly for voicing out the religious and moral dimension for all humanitarian issues.⁸² For him, all political activities fundamentally comes from human person, is exercised by person, and is aimed to person so that all political activities which are opposed to the dignity of man as a person, are truly lost their legitimations because they forget or try to eliminate their fundamental basis and end. By the human and the humanity, he did point a concrete and real man and woman as a person in its wholeness and integrity of both spiritual and material aspects. He reminded all the audiences that the Universal Declaration of the Human Right is one of the concrete efforts to create a general awareness of human dignity and respect for the rights of other in the light of the truth and justice. It encourages all nations to overcome any form of injustice and build the better and more peaceful world.⁸³

In the World Day of Peace 1991, the Pope spoke of the importance of the freedom of conscience as an essential element for human freedom so that

⁸² Cf. Pope John Paul II, *Address of His Holiness John Paul II to The 34th General Assembly Of The United Nations*, New York, October 2, 1979, art. 5, downloaded from https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/1979/october/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19791002_general-assembly-onu.html [accessed: 12/11/2021].

⁸³ Cf. *ibid.*, art. 13.

all men and women have to respect it both legally and in the ordinary daily human relation life. He realizes that the rapid transformation nowadays sometimes makes us wrongly understand that the person is a mere object governed by the greater force outside of his or her control. He strictly affirms that every man and woman who are created by God as a person, has an ability to seek and freely know the good, to recognize and reject the evil, to choose the truth and oppose the error, and those abilities are written on the human heart by God. The human conscience is by which man and woman are capable of freely judging and acting according to those abilities. He, therefore, asserts that to deny someone to complete his freedom of conscience or, in some way, to complete his freedom to seek the truth, constitutes a violation of the most personal right and it can open a possibility to provoke the conflicts at all levels of human relation. He says,

«Conscience bears witness to *transcendence of the person*, also in regard to society at large, and, as such, is inviolable. Conscience, however, is not an absolute placed above truth and error. Rather, by its very nature, it implies *a relation to objective truth*, a truth which is universal, the same for all, which all can and must seek. It is in this relation to objective truth that freedom of conscience finds its justification, inasmuch as it is a necessary condition for seeking the truth worthy of man, and for adhering to that truth once it is sufficiently known. This in turn necessarily requires that each individual's conscience be respected by everyone else; people must not attempt to impose their own 'truth' on others»⁸⁴

The objective truth itself has its foundation on the Absolute Truth which is only found in God. In this sense, the search for the truth is one and the same path as the search for God. Consequently, the freedom of conscience is strictly related to the religious freedom. In a broader sense, the systematic denial of God which is sometimes established by the ideological regime is opposed to both freedom of conscience and freedom of religion. John Paul II points that every person has a fundamental task to form his own conscience in a respect to the objective truth. The search for truth will lead not only a respect for the

⁸⁴ Pope John Paul II, *Message of His Holiness Pope John Paul II for The XXIV World Day of Peace: «If You Want Peace, Respect the Conscience of Every Person,»* Januari 1, 1991, downloaded from https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/messages/peace/documents/hf_jp-ii_mes_08121990_xxiv-world-day-for-peace.html [accessed: 12/11/2021].

search of truth that the others do, but also a desire to seek the truth together. It is thus important for the Pope to understand that the world peace is threatened by the intolerance which manifests itself in the denial of the freedom of conscience of the others, including the religious freedom.⁸⁵ It happens, for instance, when a society does not respect the freedom of conscience and the religious freedom of the individuals or of the minority groups. The Pope reconsiders that the religious freedom is the most fundamental right because the dignity of every person has its root in his essential relationship with God, the Creator who create every man according to His own image. In this sense, the religious freedom reveals the dignity of human person, the very identity of every person.

c. *Some Forms of Dialogue as a Path toward Peace*

In some of his writings, we can trace some forms of dialogue. There were at least four types that can be considered, i.e.: the ecumenical dialogue, the interreligious dialogue, the intercultural dialogue and the dialogue for resolving a conflict.

(1) *The Ecumenical Dialogue*

In 1995, John Paul II wrote a reflection about one of his pastoral ministries, that is, the unity of all Christians as it had already been mandated by the Second Vatican Council. He asks all those who believe in Christ to destroy the wall of mistrust which divides and separates the Churches, and to eliminate many barriers and prejudices by joining together to purify ourselves with the power of the truth and the sincere desire to mutually forgive each other and to make a reconciliation.⁸⁶ He gently began with the confession of the Catholic Church: «The Catholic Church acknowledges and confesses *the weaknesses of her members*, conscious that their sins are so many betrayals of and obstacles to the accomplishment of the Savior's plan.»⁸⁷ It means that the Church is con-

⁸⁵ Cf. Pope John Paul II, *Address of His Holiness John Paul II to the 34th General Assembly of the United Nations*, New York, October 2, 1979, art. 13-14.

⁸⁶ Pope John Paul II, Encyclical *Ut Unum Sint: On Commitment to Ecumenism*, published May 25, 1995, art. 2, downloaded from https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_25051995_ut-unum-sint.html [accessed: 12/10/2021]. (It is henceforth simply called *Ut Unum Sint*)

⁸⁷ *Ut Unum Sint*, art. 3.

stantly called to renew herself in the spirit of Gospel by exercising the service of the truth and charity. He then said, «I myself intend to promote every suitable initiative aimed at making the witness of the entire Catholic community understood in its fully purity and consistency, especially considering the engagement which awaits the Church at the threshold of the new Millenium.»⁸⁸

John Paul II realized that the Christian unity is based on Jesus' desire when He prayed for the unity of His fellows at the hour of His passion. The unity He desired is not only merely gathering of the people, but it should be constituted by the bonds of the profession of faith, the sacraments and the hierarchical communion, those of which the Catholic Church has been tried to preserve for the ages of her history, albeit many crises and errors by the infidelity, faults, weakness, sins of her ministers as well as her members.⁸⁹ For that reason, he firstly called all Christian to begin the actualization of ecumenical journey with an interior conversion in the personal level as well as the communal and put this desire of the unity into the truth and charity based on the Teaching of Holy Scripture and Tradition. He then pointed out, «By engaging in frank dialogue, Communities help one another to look at themselves together in the light of the Apostolic Tradition. This leads them to ask themselves whether they truly express in an adequate way all that the Holy Spirit has transmitted through the Apostle.»⁹⁰

Furthermore, he specifically defined the ecumenical dialogue as one of the Church's priorities by pointing some ideas of *Gaudium et Spes* and Paul VI's encyclical «*Ecclesiam Suam*».

«If prayer is the «soul» of ecumenical renewal and of the yearning for unity, it is the basis and support for *everything the Council defines as «dialogue»*. This definition is certainly not unrelated to today's *personalist way of thinking*. The capacity for «dialogue» is rooted in the nature of the person and his dignity. As seen by philosophy, this approach is linked to the Christian truth concerning man as expressed by the Council: man is fact «the only creature on earth which God willed for itself»; thus he cannot «fully find himself except through a sincere gift of himself. (GS, 24)... Dialogue is an indispensable step along the path *towards human self-realization*, the self-

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ *Ut Unum Sint*, art. 9-11.

⁹⁰ *Ut Unum Sint*, art. 16.

realization both of *each individual* and of *every human community*. Although the concept of «dialogue» might appear to give priority to the cognitive dimension (*dia-logos*), all dialogue implies a global, existential dimension. It involves in a particular way the subjectivity of each... In some way it is always an «exchange of gifts».⁹¹

Despite alluding to prayer and quest for the truth which characterizes and matures the ecumenical dialogue, in that statement, it is clear that he considered that the root of dialogue is in the nature of person and his dignity. It means that dialogue is not only an intellectual or cognitive conversation, but it is integral in the being-a-person who exists and acts to obtain self-realization both of each individual and of human community. The ecumenical dialogue also becomes a path to examine the Christian conscience in which all Christian should be aware of their conditions as sinners who are united by Christ in his One Church for the salvation. Here, he then outlined the process of ecumenical dialogue from 'a dialogue of conscience' toward 'a dialogue of conversion' and finally obtaining 'a dialogue of salvation'. In this sense, the ecumenical dialogue does not occur in a horizontal dimension between all men and women of God, but also has a vertical dimension which expresses the relationship all men and women with God.⁹²

The Pope emphasized, at least, three key points in both the principles and the practice for the ecumenical dialogue.⁹³ Firstly, he concerned about the method of dialogue. He followed the teaching of John XXIII that the deposit of faith, in the one hand, consists of the Truth in the Sacred Doctrines, and, in the other hand, consists of the manner of its presentation which expresses the same significations as Sacred Doctrine. He thus practiced the method of ecumenical dialogue which refers to some activities «to find language that expresses fully the faith of both parties but which avoids concepts and terminologies that were divisive in the past.»⁹⁴ The second key is the principle of gradualism which refers to a gradual and patient process of the ecumenical dialogue beginning by articulating and then developing together those things

⁹¹ *Ut Unum Sint*, art. 28

⁹² Cf. *Ut Unum Sint*, art. 33-35

⁹³ Cf. Kevin J. P. McDonald, «The Legacy of Pope John Paul II: Ecumenical Dialogue,» in Michael A. Hayes and Gerald O'Collins (eds.), *The Legacy of John Paul II*, London, 2008, p. 117-118.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

on which both are agreed to understand and articulate further the problems that have been cause of a division, and finally to resolve those problems. The third is a theological framework of *koinonia* or *communio*, within which both parties explore all divisive issues. According to the Pope, the Second Vatican Council documents, especially *Lumen Gentium* and *Unitatis Redintegratio* are two important and inspiring guidelines to establish this theological framework.⁹⁵

The ecumenical dialogue requires some authentic attitudes. The love of the truth is the most fundamental element of authentic desire toward the unity of all Christians. This kind of love is also strengthened by charity for other and humility in the presence of the truth.⁹⁶ Those attitudes lead to the acceptance of the entire truth in which the Holy Spirit, as the Church believes, will guide all disciples of Christ and will prevent them from all forms of reduction of the faith. With those attitudes, the Pope added, a dialogue would create a space to listen, to explain, to ask, and finally to understand mutually each other, even could possibly establish something new which may further enrich all the Churches and the Ecclesial Communities. Such dialogue can also urge some practical cooperation among Christians in many areas such as pastoral, cultural, and social justice. For John Paul II, such cooperation can also become a true ecumenical school for all Christians.⁹⁷

The Pope then described that the ecumenical dialogue covers not only theological encounter and common prayer, but also a practical cooperation.⁹⁸ He then confessed, «Some of my journey have a precise ecumenical «priori-

⁹⁵ As a response to Kevin McDonal, Christopher John Hill, his Anglican companion in the ecumenical dialogue adds more documents, namely, *Sacrosanctum Concilium*, *Dignitatis Humanae*, and some partly of *Dei Verbum*. Those were, he confessed, explicitly discussed as some inspirations and reasons to engage an ecumenical dialogue by Archbishop Michael Ramsey and his fellows, the Primates of the Anglican before visiting to Paul VI in Rome 1966. (See, Christopher John Hill, «Response to Chapter 6 Archbishop Kevin McDonal, the Legacy of Pope John Paul II: Ecumenical Dialogue,» in Michael A. Hayes and Gerald O'Collins (eds.), *The Legacy of John Paul II*, London, 2008, p. 130)

⁹⁶ *Ut Unum Sint*, art. 36

⁹⁷ *Ut Unum Sint*, art. 40.

⁹⁸ Cf. Pope John Paul II, *Crossing the Threshold of Hope*, p. 115: «However, no one really believes that the way toward unity is short or free of obstacles. Above all else, much prayer is needed as well as great commitment to the task of profound conversion, which can only be brought about by common prayer and joint efforts on behalf of justice, peace, and the shaping of the temporal order ever more fully in accordance with Christian value, on behalf of everything that the mission of Christians in the world demands.»

ty», especially in countries where the Catholic communities constitute a minority with respect to the post-Reformation communities or where the latter represent a considerable portion of the believers in Christ in given society.»⁹⁹ He remarked some practical cooperation especially in the social and cultural life to defend human dignity, to promote the peace, to apply Gospel into the social life, to bring the Christian spirit to the world of sciences and arts.¹⁰⁰ He asserted that it is not a mere humanitarian action, but it is truly rooted in God's Word and clearly manifests a communion of Christ's disciples. He also asserted, «The ultimate goal of the ecumenical movement is to re-establish full visible unity among all the baptized.»¹⁰¹ He finally realized that the task of ecumenism is one of his pastoral priorities in which it is not only an internal question of the Christian communities but it is the love which God has in Jesus Christ for all humanity.¹⁰²

(2) *The Interreligious Dialogue*

John Paul II often alluded to the importance of interreligious dialogue and cooperation for justice and peace. He asserts that in the mutual trust, mutual respect and sincerity, the interreligious dialogue and cooperation will contribute for establishing peace and will be a good basis for searching together for a better way to overcome the social injustice, violence or war.¹⁰³ The religion is, in fact, called to build the bridges between individuals, peoples and cultures, to be a sign of hope for humanity.¹⁰⁴ The religions plays the important and fundamental roles to realize peace since they have a responsibility «to

⁹⁹ *Ut Unum Sint*, art. 71

¹⁰⁰ Cf. *Ut Unum Sint*, art. 74.

¹⁰¹ *Ut Unum Sint*, art. 77.

¹⁰² Cf. *Ut Unum Sint*, art. 95; Cf. Pope John Paul II, *Crossing the Threshold of Hope*, p. 118: «Let's remember for that matter that the Lord Jesus conferred upon Peter certain pastoral duties, which consist in preserving the unity of the flock. The *Petrine ministry* is also a *ministry of unity*, which is carried out in the field of ecumenism. Peter's task is to search constantly for ways that will help preserve unity. Therefore, he must not create obstacles but must open up paths. Nor is this in any way at odds with the duty entrusted to him by Christ: «strengthen your brothers in faith» (cf. Luc 22:32)»

¹⁰³ Cf. Pope John Paul II, *Message of His Holiness Pope John Paul II for The XXIV World Day of Peace: «If You Want Peace, Respect the Conscience of Every Person»*, January 1, 1991.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Pope John Paul II, *Greeting Of John Paul II to the Participants in the Colloquium on «Truth, Justice, Love, Freedom: Pillars of Peace»*, Tuesday, December 2, 2003, downloaded from https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/2003/december/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_20031202_colloquium-peace.html [accessed: 12/11/2021].

teach respect for conscience, love of neighbour, justice, forgiveness, self-control, detachment from creatures, prayer and meditation.»¹⁰⁵ The peace itself should be built on the basis of justice, truth, freedom and love; those all, he believed, are taught, preserved, developed and inherited within the doctrines of the religions.

He also realized that one of the Third Millennium signs is cultural and religious pluralism which is unavoidable as a result of globalization and modern migrations. From those social phenomena, he asserts that the interreligious dialogue, which is strengthened by various kinds of cooperation, is not only important in warding off the dread spectra of those wars of the religion which often have been too bloodied in the human history, but, above all, an important basis for the world peace. Everyone who believe in God have the same duty and responsibility to realize peace so that the name of God can never be called again to legitimate any kinds of violence and terror, but it will be increasingly glorified when the call for peace is realized.¹⁰⁶

The interreligious dialogue and cooperation for justice and peace should be exercised in the spirit of mutual trust and mutual respect to the richness of each party, and sincerity. He also promoted again human dignity with the spiritual and moral value of the individuals or the communities, and always called for seeking the peaceful and plausible solutions. Indeed, the path of peace is not an easy one because it always demands a courage, patience and determination, and must be built upon a true education for peace.¹⁰⁷ For John Paul II, «Dialogue is not so much an idea to be studied as a way of living in positive relationship with others. Hence, it is important that you come to know and understand, through personal contact and experience, the religious convictions of others. Such mutual encounters can indeed enrich all those

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Pope John Paul II, *Address of His Holiness John Paul II to the Leaders of the World Religions* in Assisi, October 26, 1986, downloaded from https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/1986/october/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19861029_religioni-non-cristiane.html [accessed: 12/11/2021].

¹⁰⁶ Cf. *ibid.*; Cf. Pope John Paul II, *Message of John Paul II to Cardinal Roger Etchegaray for the 15th International Meeting of Prayers for Peace*, Barcellona, August 28, 2001, downloaded from https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/2001/september/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_20010903_etchegaray.html [accessed: 12/11/2021].

¹⁰⁷ Pope John Paul II, *Address of His Holiness John Paul II to the Members of the International Council of the «World Conference on Religion and Peace»*, July 4, 1991, downloaded from https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/1991/july/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19910704_religion-peace.html [accessed: 12/11/2021].

who participate.»¹⁰⁸ He particularly pointed out some crucial issues that need to be concerned together by all religions in the framework of the interreligious dialogue and cooperation, such as: «The transmission of human and spiritual values to new generations; human rights and responsibilities; ways to support the struggle of the poor, the hungry, the sick and the homeless for a dignified life; preservation of God's creation, his original gift to humanity; the search for peace; the call to justice.»¹⁰⁹

(3) *The Intercultural Dialogue*

John Paul II also concerned about the intercultural dialogue as an important path to establish a civilization of love and peace.¹¹⁰ The New Millennium is indicated by the globalization which makes the man and society tend toward a progressive unification in many areas of the human life such as the economic, cultural, social, and political dimensions. Human migration from one to other places for various reasons and interests make men and women encounter each other in the interpersonal relationship or the inter-communities from many distinctive cultural backgrounds. It is unavoidable reality. On the one hand, he saw that such phenomenon is an opportunity for establishing a communion of the persons which enrich various aspects of human life, both personally and communally. On the other hand, however, he saw that it may cause many sufferings because those encounters sometimes provoke new conflicts, confrontations, oppositions, including those which engage with violence. For this reason, the intercultural dialogue is a path that should be taken to re-establish a new world where everyone could lively experience justice and peace.

The Pope reminded us that we live in the world where there are many cultural complexities and diversities, and every culture has its proper historical characters which are always unique and original. The culture, as a form in which human person expresses himself, has something stable and, at the same

¹⁰⁸ Pope John Paul II, *Address of His Holiness John Paul II to the Participants in the Plenary Assembly of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue*, April 26, 1990, downloaded from https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/1990/april/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19900426_dialogo-inter-religioso.html [accessed: 12/11/2021].

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Cf. Pope John Paul II, *Message of His Holiness Pope John Paul II for the Celebration of the World Day of Peace: Dialogue between Cultures for A Civilization of Love and Peace*, January 1, 2001, downloaded from https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/messages/peace/documents/hf_jp-ii_mes_20001208_xxiv-world-day-for-peace.html [accessed: 12/11/2021].

time, gradually and step-by-step changeable, transformable and dynamic due to many factors either the internal or the external factors such as geographical, historical, etc. The particularity of culture affects to each individual within the cultural community or society so it can be said that someone possesses a certain cultural identity, as well as each individual affects to development or transforms his certain culture through their thoughts, actions, etc. The relationship between the man and culture sometime tends to any kinds of exclusivism, chauvinism or ethnocentrism. Those types express their high-esteem of themselves and the extreme rejection for another cultures, even tends to oppress others, especially the minority groups. Those extreme expressions, for ages, have become the principal source of misunderstanding which tends to trigger conflicts and even bloody confrontations.

It is important, therefore, for the intercultural dialogue, above all, to recognize that every culture is a unique and historical reality which has indeed many limitations so it always needs the others to develop and, at the same time, to avoid the extreme exclusiveness and isolation. The cultural diversity should be considered in a broader horizon of the unity of mankind. Moreover, the intercultural dialogue needs to be aware of all potentialities of misunderstanding and aggressive claim which can provoke violence and conflict. It also needs to establish the ethical commitment to promote and develop together a respect for human dignity in every level and every condition of life.

The intercultural dialogue needs openness and acceptance to other culture for the sake of the human unity. The true dialogue between cultures can lead every person to recognize the cultural diversity, to open his or her horizon of thoughts to accept each other and to cooperate. The intercultural dialogue does not mean that every person and unique community abandon their certain unique and particular cultural identity which shape them and is shaped by themselves, but they at least express their will to adapt with, to make a space for, and to integrate with other cultural identities through a peaceful path so that they can enrich each other and collaborate for their development.

In the context of human migration, the Pope also fully realized that the culture of the immigrants is sometime incompatible with the local culture so it is necessary to develop the openness and the acceptance even though it is very difficult to be done.¹¹¹ In those difficult situations, he asserted that it is impor-

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

tant to engage a dialogue by embracing a spirit of openness without yielding to indifferentism about the values of others. He also asserted that one cannot underestimate to the capacity of the cultural characteristic to develop a balance or a certain cultural equilibrium. There is no reason to be afraid to engage a dialogue because in it, all can mutually understand other values in which they believe as long as it is done in the mutual respect of freedom and conscience. In this sense, he underlined that «truth can be imposed only with the force of the truth itself, which penetrates the mind both gently and powerfully.»¹¹²

The most important thing to be realized in the intercultural dialogue is that there are values which are common to all cultures because they are rooted in the nature of person. Leaving all ideological, historical, social prejudice and selfish interests, people have to share those values. The Pope mentioned at least four values, namely, value of solidarity, of peace, of life, and of education. He saw that there is a global interdependence among countries. In the one hand, it expresses a good vibrant of the unity of all mankind as a human big family, but in the other hand, it presents more clearly many inequalities: the gap between the rich and the poor nations, the social imbalance within each nation, the human and environmental degradation, etc. In this sense, the promotion of justice lies at heart of the true culture of solidarity. This culture of solidarity has a close relation with the value of peace which is the primary objective of every society, of nation and of international community. Everyone must feel the moral duty to take some concrete and gradual steps to promote the cause of peace and understanding among people. The peace itself links to the value of life. The human life cannot be seen as an object, but it is always a sacred and inviolable earthly reality. The Pope saw that the value of life itself has to face the death culture in the practice of death penalty, modern slavery, prostitution, human trafficking, abortion, euthanasia, etc. A civilization based on love and peace which respects to the human dignity from the beginning of his life must oppose any kind of the objectification of human person. To build such civilization through a dialogue between cultures, people have to overcome the ethnocentric selfishness and respect to the others. This fundamental aspect should be a responsibility of education. In the education, every young people is not only taught about their unique cultural identity, but also about others and are led to obtain a commitment to respect the other.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

In this intercultural dialogue, the Pope alluded to the important role of social communication because for him, culture, faith and the communication are three realities on which the present and the future of our civilization depend.¹¹³ He explains that culture as a specific dimension of the existence and being of man, has created a complex bond among the persons within community determining the interpersonal and the social character of human existence. The man, as both the subject and the creator of culture, expresses himself in it. The faith is simply an encounter between man and God, and in this faith, the man responds God's revelation about His salvific plan in the human history. The faith is a gift from God that must be in accordance with man's freely response. Both culture and faith are the human experience which are also related one another in the sphere of the communication. The press, cinema, theater, radio, television have proved that culture and faith meet to each other even though their encounter is not always adequate since the mass media sometimes give incomplete and distorted picture of the man and close to the authentic human value by not giving a space to the Transcendent who can make man more complete as a man. In this situation, the mass media prevent the real encounter between culture and faith.¹¹⁴

(4) *Dialogue as non-violence path of resolving conflict*

For John Paul II, the truest dialogue is always an attempt to seek the truth, the good, and the just through a peaceful way or a non-violence path. Dialogue, therefore, always try to engage with several ways such as negotiation, mediation and arbitration to eliminate divided factors, to sharpen recognition of the human dignity and to respect of the human life from the very beginning. There are indeed several things which make a dialogue difficult to be realized such as an *a priori* decision by a rejection to listen to the other parties, a self-claim as the only measure of truth and justice, etc. They are, for the Pope, a blindness and a deaf rooted in the selfishness which are sometimes strengthened by the desire to dominate and to possess which is used to be expressed in the old propaganda: for the sake of the national sovereignty and security. Those can ultimately be used to move the citizen to go to the war heroically. In this point, he reminded

¹¹³ Cf. Pope John Paul II, *Message of the Holy Father John Paul II for the 21st World Communications Day: «Social Communications at the Service of Justice and Peace»*, May 31, 1987, downloaded from https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/messages/communications/documents/hf_jp-ii_mes_24011987_world-communications-day.html [accessed: 12/11/2021].

¹¹⁴ Cf. *ibid.*

that the ideological power which is opposed to the human dignity can make a conflict or a confrontation more dangerous and complicated.

Therefore, he particularly spoke of dialogue in the middle of conflict in both national or international level.¹¹⁵ In the national level, a dialogue should resolve social conflict by tending all elements of the nation to reach common good. Without ceasing to build a peace by committing a dialogue, all national elements which are confronted should seek the freedom and the social responsibility in a democratic atmosphere for all, respect of the cultural, ethnical, language, and religious diversity for the unity as a nation. In the international level, a dialogue should encourage all nations and states which are confronted to firmly reject using armies in order to resolve conflicts. Dialogue should lead all nations to convince that the common good of one nation cannot be reached by opposing, violating or seizing the others. Dialogue should provoke and develop a mutual understanding of the same right to live properly and experience justice. Dialogue should also care and finally can cure all the historical wounds for better now and future.

d. *Several General Attitudes which are Required for Dialogue*

John Paul II many times emphasized that dialogue is a difficult path to take, but it is possible to realize for the sake of peace. He, therefore, explicitly explained several general attitudes that must be possessed and developed by everyone who is called to make a dialogue for peace.

The first and foremost attitude that must be possessed is love and openness to the truth. The pope believed that all human beings have by nature a capacity, thanks to the God's grace, to disclose the truth about themselves and the world around them, and to direct themselves toward the Absolute truth, namely, God.¹¹⁶ He said clearly in *Fides et Ratio*:

«It is the nature of the human being to seek the truth. This search looks not only to the attainment of truths which are partial, empirical or scientific; nor is it only in individual acts of decision-making that people seek the true

¹¹⁵ Cf. Pope John Paul II, *Message of His Holiness Pope John Paul II for the Celebration of the Day of Peace: Dialogue for Peace, A Challenge for Our Time*, Januari 1, 1983.

¹¹⁶ Cf. Pope John Paul II, *Encyclical Letter «Fides et Ratio»*, published in September 14, 1998, blessing before introduction, downloaded from https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_14091998_fides-et-ratio.html [accessed: 01/10/2022]. (It is henceforth simply called *Fides et Ratio*)

good. Their search looks towards an ulterior truth which would explain the meaning of life. And it is therefore a search which can reach its end only in reaching the absolute.»¹¹⁷

This attitude also stimulates people to continuously seek and be open to the truth, to be critical, analytical and reflective before various offers of the truth, in the sense of that which does not passively accept the truth, and avoids the errors, falsehoods, and various understandings that reduce the truth.¹¹⁸

Man's searching for the truth often neither smoothly goes nor successfully works as expected. Of course, there are many factors that could be the cause. Nevertheless, according to John Paul II, the first and foremost factor is the fact that human reason is limited and it is further exacerbated by a certain internal conditions that can obscure and distort the search.¹¹⁹ Therefore, love of truth must be accompanied by the attitude of humility in the face of truth. This humility means firstly awareness of one's limitations in order to fully understand the truth, acknowledging that the measure of the truth is not in oneself, and strengthening a sincere and honest openness to the truth. This

¹¹⁷ *Fides et Ratio*, art. 33.

¹¹⁸ In his Encyclical Letter *Fides et Ratio*, Pope John Paul II warns about some ways of thinking which are common in the ordinary life whereas they reduce the full meaning of the truth, such as: *eclecticism* (an approach or method in which one uses several scientific, philosophical or even theological terms or doctrines that are considered separate from their internal coherence or historical context. Therefore, it is easy to fall into the risk of not being able to distinguish the part of the truth of a particular doctrine from its elements which may be wrong or ill-suited with the task at hand. The eclecticism arises in the misuse of the philosophical rhetoric that does not help the search for truth and does not train the reason [*Fides et Ratio*, art. 86]), *historicism* (a doctrine which claims that the truth is determined on the basis of its appropriateness to a certain period and a certain historical purpose so that what was true in the one period, may not be true in another [*Fides et Ratio*, art. 87]), *scientism* (a doctrine which only accepts the validity of the truth from the positive sciences and claims the religious, theological, ethical, and aesthetical knowledge as a fantasy and meaningless. The scientism therefore leads toward the impoverishment of human thought and develops the scientific mentality in which if something is technically possible it is therefore morally admissible [*Fides et Ratio*, art. 88]), *pragmatism* (an attitude of mind which bases its theoretical and practical judgment on its ethical principles focused only on the practical consequences. The truth is therefore considered in so far as it has some beneficial practical consequences. As a result, the human being is understood in the one-dimensional vision which excludes all possible ethical dilemmas and existential reflection of the human negative experience such as a misery, suffering, death, etc. [*Fides et Ratio*, art. 89]), *Nihilism* (a denial of all foundations and negation of all objective truth. Consequently, nihilism is also a denial of the humanity with all its very identity which leads us to understand profoundly the human dignity and the meaning of human life [*Fides et Ratio*, art. 90])

¹¹⁹ *Fides et Ratio*, art. 28.

kind of humility strengthens the courage to keep searching for and listening to any sources of the truth, including the truth of the others because, above all, every person can and must preserve enough confidence in the man, in his capacity of being reasonable, in his sense of the good, the just and the fair, and also in his brotherly love and hope.¹²⁰

This man's searching can never ignore the role of another person because the man lives together with other. In the process of knowing, the man entrusts himself to the knowledge that has been given to him by other persons, such as parents or teachers. In that kind of process, the Pope was more interested in the man himself than the knowledge. He saw that human capacity for achieving the knowledge is enriched by a deeper ability to trust the others and to enter into a relationship with them more intimately and lastingly. The truth that he gains in this process is greater and richer than the truth of knowledge because such truth obtained from the relationship with other, both in the interpersonal and the social relationship, is not primarily an empirical or a philosophical truth, but rather is the truth about person, namely, the person as he or she really is, and what he reveals from the depths of himself. This truth of person is certainly not an abstract truth, but the truth that comes from a dynamic relationship of a mutual trust and self-giving with others.¹²¹

Therefore, the openness to others and acceptance of others based on the love of truth, the humility before the truth, and the awareness of the specific role of others in the search for truth is a necessity. In that openness and acceptance, listening to other persons with all their personal richness (knowledge, beliefs, principles of life, ways of thinking, cultural identity, etc.) as they really are is the key to enter into a true dialogue. On contrary, refusing to listen to the others actually builds a barrier and wall to start a dialogue.¹²²

e. *The Agents of Dialogue*

In his calls for dialogue for peace, the Pope always invited every Christian and every person of the good will to get involved. He convinced that dialogue is rooted in human nature as a person who has a vocation as well as an

¹²⁰ Cf. Pope John Paul II, *Message of His Holiness Pope John Paul II for the Celebration of the Day of Peace: Dialogue for Peace, A Challenge for Our Time*, Januari 1st, 1983.

¹²¹ Cf. *Fides et Ratio*, art. 32

¹²² Cf. Pope John Paul II, *Message of His Holiness Pope John Paul II for the Celebration of the Day of Peace: Dialogue for Peace, A Challenge for Our Time*, Januari 1, 1983.

ability to reveal the truth, desires and tries hard to realize the good for himself or herself and his or her community, and lives together in a particular community, with a certain social, cultural and historical identity and also has an ability to build the relationship with others especially for obtaining common good. It is clear that everyone longs to live together in a just and peaceful condition, and to avoid a life of misery and suffering. Therefore, the Pope believed that everyone is capable of being an agent of dialogue, even though dialogue itself is very difficult to realize. Everyone should use any opportunities to break down the barrier of selfishness, lack understanding, and aggression to the others by engaging a dialogue in the family, community, society because dialogue for peace is the task of everyone.¹²³

In particular, the Pope appealed to the Christians who believe in Jesus Christ. He often gave a clear image of Jesus Christ as the one who unites the man with the Father, the man with his neighbour, especially those who are poor, persecuted and suffer. He also explained that Jesus also claimed himself as a witness to the Truth. He also mentioned more specifically the role of the Catholic Church in seeking both the ecumenical and the interreligious unity as brothers and sisters, the children of God, especially since the Second Vatican Council. He referred several times to his predecessors as the agents of dialogue for the world unity and peace, especially John XXIII and Paul VI. He also openly revealed that the ecumenical unity was one of the priority programs of his ministry as the Supreme Pontifex of the Catholic Church.

The Pope's calls for a dialogue for peace were also addressed specifically to a certain people who play important role in the social life. He advised the leaders of the states and governments should lead their people to experience a true peace, foster and permit all condition for a dialogue, be able to conduct a dialogue in the national as well as in the international level with the other countries.¹²⁴ They should promote the intercultural dialogue to unite all diverse elements of the nation.¹²⁵ They should delegate the diplomats who have a strong commitment for peace by always seeking some appropriate and plausible resolutions for any conflict or confrontation with patience and perseverance through a dialogue, and by avoiding to recourse the arms. He unceasing-

¹²³ *Ibid.*

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ Cf. Pope John Paul II, *Message of the Holy Father John Paul II for the 21st World Communications Day: «Social Communications at the Service of Justice and Peace»*, May 31, 1987.

ly encouraged those leaders to be the promoters and the agents of dialogue for peace in the international levels. The international organizations should be a suitable place where the encounters and a dialogue for peace can be engaged and should prevent themselves from any kinds of manipulation which could be provoked by any nation or corporation who forces their interests.¹²⁶

John Paul II also gave a special attention to media communication as an agent of the truth which should always create a good sphere for realizing a dialogue for peace and unity.¹²⁷ He realizes that peace itself is impossible without a dialogue, but the true dialogue cannot be established without being well-informed.¹²⁸ In its true nature, the mass media «are here to offer themselves as agents who have a special role in this endeavour to achieve responsible human freedom.»¹²⁹ However, it often becomes the instruments of certain economic, political and ideological power that can be oppressive and reject pluralism. In that situation, the truth may be manipulated and violated by those abusive power so there might be not a true freedom in various cases, including the religious freedom or the freedom for seeking the truth. The Pope thus reminded that «Truth must never be distorted, justice neglected, love forgotten, if one is to observe ethical standards. To forget or lose sight of these is to produce bias, scandal, submission to the powerful, compliance with reason of state.»¹³⁰ In this sense, he asserted that all man and woman is called to be himself and herself as a free and responsible person, a user of the mass media, not merely an object, an active and critical, not passive one. However, people of the world have a fundamental right to be well-informed and always need enlightened opinion especially in the middle of conflict or war circumstances. The mass media, the social communication and also the journalists have a responsibility to share the greatest objectivity, the rights, the problems, the attitudes of each of the parties in order to promote the mutual understanding and a dialogue

¹²⁶ Cf. Pope John Paul II, *Message of His Holiness Pope John Paul II for the Celebration of the Day of Peace: Dialogue for Peace, A Challenge for Our Time*, Januari 1, 1983.

¹²⁷ Cf. Pope John Paul II, *Message of the Holy Father John Paul II for the 15th World Communications Day: «Social Communications in the Service of Responsible Human Freedom»*, May 31, 1981, downloaded from https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/messages/communications/documents/hf_jp-ii_mes_10051981_world-communications-day.html [accessed: 12/11/2021].

¹²⁸ Cf. Pope John Paul II, *Message of the Holy Father John Paul II for the 21st World Communications Day: «Social Communications at the Service of Justice and Peace»*, May 31, 1987.

¹²⁹ Pope John Paul II, *Message of the Holy Father John Paul II for the 15th World Communications Day: «Social Communications in the Service of Responsible Human Freedom»*, May 31, 1981.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

between groups, countries, and civilizations.¹³¹ It is necessary for them to encourage people to overcome all barriers of the race, class, culture which may stimulates the intolerance and may also generates a mistrust, by presenting the true and objective information which develop the way of awareness, of verification, of controlling the reality of fact on the paths of peace.¹³²

2.2.2. Some Dialogue Performed by John Paul II

As it was mentioned several times above, John Paul II put the dialogue concerning about various humanitarian issues as one of his Pontifical ministerial priorities and he had clearly showed it especially in his concrete actions. He had engaged many dialogues with many persons and communities from many different social, cultural, religious, and political backgrounds. Those could be categorized in several types of dialogue.

a. *The encounters with the Christian of the Other Churches and the Ecclesial Communities in the Ecumenical Dialogue*

John Paul II believes that the ecumenical dialogue and cooperation are the pathways toward the fullest communion of the Christians in one faith in Jesus Christ and in one Church.¹³³ This communion should be burnt by a spirit of the prayer for unity. He, therefore, had a habit that he had to do in the ecumenical meetings, that is, praying for the unity of the Christians. He undoubtedly kneed and started praying in the church of any communities he visited.¹³⁴

¹³¹ Cf. Pope John Paul II, *Message of His Holiness Pope John Paul II for the Celebration of the Day of Peace: Dialogue for Peace, A Challenge for Our Time*, Januari 1, 1983.

¹³² Cf. Pope John Paul II, *Message of the Holy Father John Paul II for the 21st World Communications Day: «Social Communications at the Service of Justice and Peace,»* May 31, 1987.

¹³³ Kevin J. P. McDonald, «The Legacy of Pope John Paul II: Ecumenical Dialogue,» p. 115.

¹³⁴ Archbishop of Southwark, England, Kevin J. P. Mc. Donald who had worked since 1985-1993 in the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity divides the ecumenical dialogue that were engaged especially by Pope John Paul II in a multilateral dialogue, for example between the Catholic and the World Council of Churches involving a wide sphere of the Christian Churches and the Ecclesial Communities, and a bilateral dialogue, for example, between the Catholic and the Orthodox, or the Catholic with the Anglican. He also adds the distinction between the ecumenical dialogue with the Churches and the Ecclesial Communities with whom the Catholic has had historical break, such as with the Orthodox, the Lutheran, the Anglican, and with those who have existed because of the spread of the Reformation into many branches, such as the Methodist or the Pentecostals. With the formers, the ecumenical dialogue tends to

One of the memorable ecumenical meetings he had done was bilateral meetings with the Ecumenical Patriarch Orthodox of Constantinople, Dimitrios I, both when he visited him in Phanar, Istanbul, Turkey (November 28-30, 1979) as well as when he was visited in Rome (December 3-7, 1987). The meetings were described as an encounter between Peter and Andrew, two brothers who were the apostles of Jesus since the Pope is Peter's successor whereas the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople is Andrew's.¹³⁵ One of the sweetest fruits of this encounter was the establishment of a Joint International Commission for the Theological Dialogue between the Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church in 1979 which seriously concerned of theological studies in various areas for re-establishing a communion between two Churches as two sisters.¹³⁶ In Rome (1987), they also signed a Common Declaration for theological dialogue and cooperation in some common actions for justice and peace around the world.¹³⁷

When he visited the United Kingdom in May 1982, the Pope also gathered some ecumenical activities with the Primate of the Anglican Church,

focus on some specific issues that caused the break of the communion and tried to build a real bridge to reunite, whereas with the latter, he said, «It has been a question of discerning the most promising topic for finding rapprochement.» (Kevin J. P. McDonald, «The Legacy of Pope John Paul II: Ecumenical Dialogue,» p. 116)

It also has to be known that the Eastern Churches consist of two distinct categories: the Oriental Orthodox (the Ancient Oriental Churches) and the Byzantine Churches who are 14 autocephalous Eastern Churches in a communion with the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople as *primus inter pares*. The Ancient Oriental Churches rejected a dogmatic formulation in two ecumenical councils of Ephesus (431) and of Chalcedon (451). They rejected the term in which Christ was a divine person with two natures, the human and the divine. The dialogue with those churches began in 1973 when Paul VI made a Common Declaration with Pope Shenouda III, Pope of Alexandria and Head of the Coptic Church in which both agreed with the same expression of one faith in Christ without using the historical divisive term of the person and the nature. John Paul II continued Paul VI's effort to dialogue with the Syrian Orthodox Church 1971, by making other common declaration in 1984 with Mar Ignatius Zakka 'I, the Syrian Orthodox Church in which he ratified a previous agreement and built on it. Otherwise, with the Byzantine Churches with whom Paul VI began to build a personal relationship with the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, Athenagoras by meeting him in the Holy Land, John Paul II continued the legacy of Paul VI by officially visiting to Constantinople in 1979 and seriously taking a path of the ecumenical dialogue with them (*Ibid.*, p. 119-121)

¹³⁵ George Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, p. 358-361.

¹³⁶ *Ut Unum Sint*, art. 59.

¹³⁷ George Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, p. 555-557.

Archbishop Robert Runcie in the Cathedral of Canterbury.¹³⁸ It was the first time in the history that a pope met with the leader of the Anglican Church even though it occurred in a fully anxious situation.¹³⁹ After praying together in the Cathedral, both signed a Common Declaration of Unity stressing in developing some programs of the ecumenical dialogue and cooperation in accordance with the hope of the Second Vatican Council. That historical en-

¹³⁸ According to Christopher Hill, both leaders of Catholics and Anglicans lit some candles in a memory of seven twentieth-century martyrs: Maximilian Kolbe, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Janani Luwum (the Anglican Archbishop of Uganda tortured and executed by Uganda's dictator Idi Amin), Maria Skobtsova (the Russian Orthodox nun), Martin Luther King, Jr., Oscar Romero, and the unknown and unnamed martyrs. For Hill, that prayer in a memory of the martyrs was very important because it expressed the John Paul II's belief in which cited in *Ut Unum Sint*, he thought that the communion of the Churches also includes the communion of the saints and martyrs, the witnesses of the Truth (Christopher John Hill, «Response to Chapter 6 Archbishop Kevin McDonal,» p. 130-131). He also commented: «Here is the importance of Pope John Paul II's visit to England and Wales, and especially his visit to Canterbury Cathedral. Worship is at the heart of Anglicanism... so the significance of the Canterbury visit with the Archbishop of Canterbury cannot be underestimated: especially when we add the 'power' of the communion of saints...» (*Ibid.*, p. 136)

¹³⁹ Before John Paul II's pontifical ministry, there was a common declaration signed between Paul VI and Archbishop of Canterbury, Michael Ramsey. The Anglican, as McDonald wrote, had been enthusiastic engaging a dialogue with the Catholic and being encouraged by the Ecumenical Council of Vatican II. A few years after the Vatican II, a joint preparatory commission was set up in 1968 and it proposed some practical steps to a rapprochement between Catholics and Anglicans. the First Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission (ARCIC) had begun to meet in 1970 till 1981 and produced some joint statements in three main topics: the Eucharist, the Ministry and the Ordination, and the Authority of the Church. Those topics are some factors that were determined as the causes of the break among them. In John Paul II's period, the dialogues were satisfying developing especially toward a reconciliation and a real communion. The John Paul II's visit to the United Kingdom in 1982 was a historical visit especially for a further dialogue between Catholics and Anglicans. It was John Paul II whose ecumenical initiation, vision and attitudes were enlightened all the process of dialogue between Anglicans and Catholics. (Kevin J. P. McDonald, «The Legacy of Pope John Paul II: Ecumenical Dialogue,» p. 124-127)

In addition, Weigel notes that Pope's visit to UK happened eight weeks after Argentina attacking the Falkland Islands which they had claimed as the lost territory of Argentina. When the Vatican diplomats prepared that visit, they were very anxious with the political tensions. Argentina is a state whose majority of its citizen were Catholics, whereas the majority of UK's citizen were Anglican. The political tension between both countries could be higher because of the negative sentiments, hatreds, rivalries of the Anglican toward the Catholics. In order to balance the situation, the days before flying to London, the Pope asked to his fellows in the Curia to plan an abrupt pastoral visit to Argentina the days after visiting UK. Finally, the Pope visited Argentina nine days after he had visited UK when it was clear that Argentina would be lost in the war even though they had not officially declared it. The pope's visit then focused on reanimating and encouraging the people of Argentina who suffered because of the war. (George Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, p. 434-435)

counter finally brought some fruits of several dialogues in the broader and fuller theological studies and pastoral actions between the Catholics and the Anglicans.¹⁴⁰

In order to encourage the internal Catholic Church to take more responsibility for doing a dialogue, the Pope invited the ecumenical commissions of the 63 national bishop's conferences in April 22-27, 1985, to reflect the Christians unity after 20 years of the Second Vatican Council. He stressed in that meeting that the ultimate of the ecumenical movement is full communion of the Christians in one Apostolic Credo and one participation in the Eucharist which is a real expression of Trinitarian unity.¹⁴¹

As he mentioned several times, dialogue is always never an easy path. After many encounters with leaders of other Churches, many efforts to strengthen theological dialogue and cooperation for promoting justice and peace around the world, the relationship between the Catholic Church and the Others during his papacy was several times disharmonic.¹⁴² The Pope was really aware

¹⁴⁰ When he visited Zambia, for instance, in the early May 1989, the Pope together with the Anglican leaders called for a dialogue and cooperation to abandon any kinds of competitions or rivalries in the act of the evangelization in Africa, and concerned much more about promoting the good way of life to counter the consumerism. They also warned the government about the negative impact of the foreign debts for the economic development. (Cf. George Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, p. 591)

¹⁴¹ George Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, p. 494-495.

¹⁴² The ecumenical dialogue with the Orthodox and Lutheran were, for instance, in a crisis during 1997-1998. When Pope had arranged the ecumenical meeting with the Russian-Orthodox Patriarch, Aleksy II, it emerged a negative reaction from the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, Bartolomew I because of some mis-steps, misconceptions, misjudgment and misunderstanding. It might happen because of the internal tension occurred among the Orthodox. Those internal tensions coupled with several new problems, strained the Catholic and the Orthodox relationship that had been rebuilt for two decades (George Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, p. 819-822). The crisis also occurred in the theological dialogue with Lutherans on the doctrine of justification by faith. Even though the dialogue had successfully generated a joint declaration that both Churches have different forms, but it cannot impede the unity, it arose a mistrust and the feeling of betrayed and hurt for missteps and misunderstanding of some official statements. Thanks to reconsidering the desire of the unity, both Churches found again a mutual trust and solution for the problem and finally both signed a new Joint Declaration of Augsburg, October 31, 1999 (*Ibid.*, p. 827-828).

McDonald also notes that the dialogue between the Catholic and the Orthodox faced some serious difficulties when the East Europe faced the fall of the Communism since 1989, but it was also bringing the re-emergence and revival of the Eastern-Rite Catholic Church, the Churches who celebrate their liturgical rite in the Eastern tradition but are still in a communion with the Catholic Rome, which were living in the underground during the Communist regimes in the Eastern Europe. The Pope tried to make a dialogue with the Orthodox because in some cases

that there were many subjective conditions which impacted, especially some psychological and historical aspects.¹⁴³ Nevertheless, it did not dampen his zeal for a dialogue based on the conviction that the Christian unity is the will of Jesus himself, and consequently, his mission in the world.

b. *The Encounters with the Religious Leaders and Members of the Other Religions in the Interreligious Dialogue*

One of the most important and valuable legacies of John Paul II regarding the interreligious dialogue and cooperation is the World Day of Prayer for Peace which had been established since 1986, where many leaders and members of the diverse religious communities around the world (Catholics, Christians, non-Christians, or indigenous religions) were gathering in Assisi to pray together for the world peace and for the people who suffer because of some conflicts and violence in some countries. Since it had been announced for the first time, this movement provoked some negative reactions, especially from those who considered it as a new form of the syncretism. The Pope himself emphasized that it is not true to consider «universal praying together» as a syncretism since it refers to «being together to pray for world peace». In the first meeting, he pointed Cardinal Roger Etchegaray, the President of Pontifical Commission for Justice and Peace to find the most adequate formula through which the end of that meeting, «being together to pray» could be obtained. The Spirit of Assisi was then introduced and maintained by the Pope as the spirit of the Church which always opens herself to engage a dialogue based on her true faith which is nurtured and strengthened by the prayers.

Moreover, John Paul II also created a new history when the Supreme Pontiff for the first time visited the Jewish-Rome community in a synagogue of Rome.¹⁴⁴ That Jewish community in Rome was considered as one of the oldest Jewish communities in the world because it had existed since the Ro-

there were some problems had to be solved between the Eastern-Rite Catholic Church and the Orthodox, especially that which occurred in Ukraine, for example, the problem of conversion or proselytize in the Orthodox territory and of the ownership of the Church's buildings. (Kevin J. P. McDonald, «The Legacy of Pope John Paul II: Ecumenical Dialogue,» p. 122-123).

¹⁴³ Pope John Paul II, *Crossing the Threshold of Hope*, p. 113-114.

¹⁴⁴ George Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, p. 482-485.

man Empire ruled before Christ. During those long times, they had experienced many different sufferings and had become the object of hate of many groups, including of the Catholics. In that visit, the Pope kindly told his story about his Jewish childhood friend, about his father who taught him to exercise tolerance, about an old priest who taught him to refuse the anti-semitism because it is opposed to the Gospel of love, about his experience of evil during Nazi's occupation in Poland, and about his knowledge of some concentration camps and holocaust in Poland. He was welcomed by the leader of that community, Giacomo Taban. He confessed that the meeting was not official meeting as a result of a negotiation, but it was rather more a sincere meeting of the sons of Abraham who believe in One God, give Him thanks and praise Him in the entire of life. The Pope also affirmed that the relationship between the Catholic Church and Judaism is very special and it could not be found in the relationship with other religions because Judaism intrinsically exists, not extrinsically, within Christianity so they can be called as a beloved elder brother. This warmed-heartedly encounter with the Jewish community became livelier because in the other occasions, he asserted that dialogue between Judaism and Catholicism is an important part for each other to develop a fabric of the religious commitment and vocation as Jewish and as Catholics. By understanding the Jewish spiritual tradition, all Catholics would comprehend the root as well as the richness of their own tradition of the faith and spirituality.¹⁴⁵

John Paul II also engaged some encounters with Muslims around the world. One of the memorable moments is his encounter with over 80.000 young Muslims in the Casablanca Stadium, Morocco, in August 19, 1985.¹⁴⁶ He came to that historical encounter because King Hasan II had invited him and reminded him that he had a moral responsibility not only to guide and take care of his flock, but also to educate young people around the world, including young Muslims in his country for shaping the better future enlightened by moral and the spiritual virtues. The Pope fully respected King Hasan II as a very good leader of an Islamic state since he guaranteed the religious freedom in Morocco. In that occasion, the Pope spoke of the importance for all believers to be a witness of what he or she believes in, that is, God who

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 492.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 499-500.

for Christian as well as Muslims is always the source of joy, and that witness should be manifested in a morally good quality of life, especially respecting and defending the human rights, taking down all barrier to encounter with the other people of the other social, cultural, religious, political backgrounds, and together build a fraternal world marked by solidarity.¹⁴⁷

The Pope wanted to realize the spirit of the Second Vatican Council, not only for the unity of the Christians, but also for the unity of all mankind. Therefore, the interreligious dialogue is an attempt to reach all of humanity, even with those who do not believe. For him, all religions reveal the unity of all mankind in front of the eternal and ultimate destiny of man. According to him, the contemporary world was lack of that sense of spiritual and religious values whose fundamental source is the Transcendent God.¹⁴⁸ Through the interreligious dialogue, he intended to build a necessary acknowledgement of the other faith and the commonalities, to release the act of tolerance for gaining the peace and peaceful communal living and human growth, and to develop mutual understanding not by imposing our view upon the others, but by respectfully listening to one another, to seek all the good, and to cooperate for promoting justice and peace.¹⁴⁹ However, like as the ecumenical dialogue,

¹⁴⁷ It was also the same as his reflection in *Crossing the Threshold of Hope* in which he stated that even though there are many differences between Islam and Catholic, including many years of conflicts and confrontation, a dialogue with Islam nowadays is still important to «work toward mutual understanding as well as toward the preservation and promotion of social justice, moral welfare, peace and freedom for the benefit of mankind.» (Pope John Paul II, *Crossing the Threshold of Hope*, p. 74-75).

In his visit to the Umayyad Great Mosque in Damascus where were used to the ancient Cathedral of John the Baptist, the Pope asserted that St. John of the Baptist (or Yahya in Muslim's tradition) is venerated by both Muslims and Catholics so he called for Catholics as well Muslims to imitate his path: dedicating the whole life only to God, even crowned with a martyrdom, being a witness of the God's truth and justice. He also asserted the centrality of praying for both Catholics and Muslims because man-person is a spiritual being called for seeking in all things and experiences the Absolute truth, that is, God, and the importance to see churches and mosques as the places where Catholics and Muslims shape their own religious identities which are different from each other, but have to be acknowledge respectfully and never promote and justify hatred and violence which can only destroy the image of the Creator (Cf. Christian W. Troll, «John Paul II and Islam,» in Michael A. Hayes and Gerald O'Collins (eds.), *The Legacy of John Paul II*, London, 2008, p. 213-214).

¹⁴⁸ Cf. Pope John Paul II, *Crossing the Threshold of Hope*, p. 63, 123; Cf. Christian W. Troll, «John Paul II and Islam,» p. 217.

¹⁴⁹ Cf. Simonetta Calderini, «Response to Chapter 8 Professor Christian Troll's paper John Paul II and Islam,» in Michael A. Hayes and Gerald O'Collins (eds.), *The Legacy of John Paul II*, London, 2008, p. 224-225.

the interreligious dialogue does not always work as expected. The psychological and historical factors have a major influence on the growth of hatred and suspicion among the religious adherents.¹⁵⁰

c. *The encounters with Heads of State and Government in Some High Tensions and Conflicts among Nations*

John Paul II concerned with humanitarian issues around the world, especially poverty, violence, injustice, conflicts and wars. In every meeting with the leaders of government, he tried to emphasize the responsibility to guarantee and defend all human rights of each citizen, especially the religious freedom for social development and promoting social justice.¹⁵¹ The root of social injustice which provokes violence and conflict is the failure of the state to guarantee human rights of its people. He insisted, therefore, especially all bishop not to be silent in the face of people's sufferings. Hand-

¹⁵⁰ When the Pope announced the beatification (Cologne, May 1, 1987), then the canonization (October 11, 1998) of Edith Stein or Sr. Benedicta of the Cross, and claimed that she is «the eminent daughter of Israel and faithful daughter of the Church.» Some radical Jewish leaders judged that the Pope actually intended to claim the memory of Nazi atrocities and the holocaust to Jews as a Christian heritage. They thought that Edith Stein died because of her Jewishness, not her Catholic faith. The issue was for them a dirty way of the Catholic Church to get new Catholic members from the Jewish community. Likewise, they accused that the Catholic Church seemed to be silent in the midst of Nazi atrocities (See. George Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, p. 541, 823-826, 859). Whereas with Islam or the other religions, especially in the Eastern, Southern and South East Asia, people often associate the Christianity with the Western colonization which caused many sufferings of people of those countries for many centuries, and with the Western way of life or Westernization which is sometimes quietly not compatible with the Asian or Eastern way of life (Cf. Pope John Paul II, *Crossing the Threshold of Hope*, p. 64).

¹⁵¹ Weigel noted some Pope's visit to the countries which were governed by the dictator regimes in which the corruptions, the violence against the political oppositions, the oppression and discrimination to the minority groups were common sense for them. He met several leaders from the various political and ideological backgrounds. He met Mobutu Sese Seko, a dictator of Zaire (George Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, p. 373). He met a Marxist President of Congo who during his visit had let the people get free days and celebrate the 'open-air' mass; he met Ferdinand Marcos, the dictator of the Philippines who were opposed to the Church led by Cardinal Sin, and insisted him to respect the human rights (*Ibid.*, p. 392); He met the president of Brazil and his fellows who were mostly Catholics to cease the violence against his political opponents, to concern more in the well-being of the poor, to pay attention on the problems of indigenous people of Amazon. (Weigel, 479-480); he also met the leader of military regime in South Korea and Indonesia and urged them to respect to the human rights for all citizen including to the minority (*Ibid.*, 595-597)

in-hand with people of the good will, the Church has to involve herself searching the better solution for those humanitarian issues. The Church's involvement into those issues does not mean that neither the Church enters into the practical politics in such way to get a political power nor conducts her activities in a certain ideological way. The Church involves because her moral responsibility based on her firmly faith to uphold and defend the human rights, justice and peace.¹⁵²

In various conflicts, acts of violence and wars around the world, the Pope tried not to be silent. He always urged to make a dialogue as a path of the national as well as the international reconciliation. By his presence or his personal delegations, he tried to initiate a dialogue and to play his or the Church's role as a mediator who assisted the process of dialogue for the reconciliation.¹⁵³ He designed by himself or inspired the Church's mission for a reconciliation in many countries such as Lebanon, Mozambique, Angola, South Africa, Sudan,

¹⁵² The Pope firmly refused any theology of liberation which based their assumptions on the Marxist social analysis, especially on the theory of class struggling with violence and using arms, and against the clerics who involved further into the practical politics. When he visited for the first time some countries in the Central America in March 1983, he criticized the Sandinista who governed in Nicaragua because they caused the separation of the Church by considering her into two categories: the 'Popular Church' (pro-government) and the 'Institutional Church' (contra-government). John Paul II called for the unity of the Church and urged the clerics who worked in the political offices to withdraw and to return to his pastoral activities as a real pastor for his flock (George Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, p. 451-457).

The Pope also concerned about the Philippines social movement in 1980s. He supported the 'People Power' in the Philippines guided and led by the pastoral and moral leadership of Cardinal Sin. Cardinal Sin claimed that the 'People Power' was inspired by 'Polish *Solidarno*' and by the way of the Church, or better to speak, of the Pope who supported that social movement for the good of Poland and ultimately for the sake of the entire of Europe and of humanity. The 'People Power' based on social movement against mendacity, corrupted, vicious and brutal regime of Marcos. This social movement did not correspond to class struggling and promoted non-violence movement. For John Paul II, Cardinal Sin had played role as a good pastor, not a politician because his involvement was moral, not political (George Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, 509-510).

¹⁵³ He sent Cardinal Raul Silva Henriquez, SDB, to guide and accompany the process of a bilateral dialogue between Argentina and Chile which were in conflict during 1978-1984 (George Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, p. 532). He also sent Cardinal Roger Etchegaray, the President of the Pontifical Commission for Justice and Peace in very special mission to Teheran (Iran) and Baghdad (Iraq), to design any possible way for peace in the middle of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980s. Cardinal Etchegaray himself saw that his very special mission was, first of all, not an official diplomacy task, but it was rather more a representation of Pope himself who was concerned very much with any conflicts around the world, so he described the pope as well as himself as «a man above, not outside, politics.» (George Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, p. 532)

Namibia, Cuba, between Indonesia and East Timor, some Balkan countries, etc.¹⁵⁴.

The encounter with Gorbachev, the leader of the Soviet Union might be the most historical and the most highlighted by the mass media around the world because it was the first time for both the Catholic leader, the representative of Christ in the world for the billions of people, and the leader of the Communist-Atheistic Soviet Union and its communist satellite countries, to gather a formal meeting. Weigel told that the Pope believed that Gorbachev was a man of the principles; without ceasing to try to save the communism, he was the man who can talk, discuss, understand even though he was surely able to concern only about the political power.¹⁵⁵ They had a close meeting in Pope's library accompanied only with two interpreters for each one for about one and a half hour. It clearly seemed that the Pope urged the Soviet Union for the religious freedom. Gorbachev himself told that the Pope told him about his conviction and hope of the communion of Europe from the Ural to the Atlantic without any blocs within it.¹⁵⁶

d. *The encounters with the Scientists and the Academic Scholars, especially in Dialogue between Faith and Science*

John Paul II was interested in the intellectual and academic activities. He used to discuss or debate with some scientists, philosophers, and theologians. As a pope, he continued to build a bridge for scientists, philosophers, and theologians not only because of his personal interest, but it was rather more his pastoral vision in which he intended all intellectuals, Catholic or non-Catholics, believers or nonbelievers, could find their roles to solve many humanitarian issues, to defend the humanity, to make a better world. He urged the intellectuals to make a continual dialogue between faith and sciences for promoting social justice. Weigel also noted that despite several difficulties, the intellectual meeting at Castel Gondolfo is one of the trendmarks in John Paul II's papacy because those seminars are not merely about his personal interest, but it is really evidence that he paid a serious attention

¹⁵⁴ George Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, p. 506.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 602.

¹⁵⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 603-604.

and commitment to the intellectual dialogue for developing a more humanistic civilization. In his reflection «Gift and Mystery» regarding 50th his priesthood, he wrote:

Thanks to meetings and discussions with naturalists, physicists, biologists and even historians I have learned to appreciate the importance of the other branches of knowledge concerning the scientific disciplines, which are also given the possibility of reaching the truth from different angles. It is therefore necessary that the splendor of truth –*Veritatis Splendor*– accompany them continuously, allowing men to meet, exchange reflections and mutually enrich each other. I brought with me from Cracow to Rome the tradition of periodic interdisciplinary meetings, which take place regularly in the summer in Castel Gandolfo. I try to be faithful to this good practice.¹⁵⁷

In November 10, 1979, by his own initiative in front of members and participants of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, the Pope announced his interest to re-examine the Galileo Affair¹⁵⁸, and in July 31, 1981, he concretized it by establishing a commission which has a special duty to re-examine Galileo affair from various points of view: theological, biblical, science, historical, and law.¹⁵⁹ The commission was led by Cardinal Paul Poupard, the President of Pontifical Council for Culture. In October 31, 1992, in the 350th anniversary of Galileo's death, the commission met the Pope, after studying hard about the Galileo case for 11 years, and presented their report.¹⁶⁰ They found that St. Robert Bellarmine, the most authoritative theologian at that

¹⁵⁷ Pope John Paul II, *Gift and Mystery*, Chapter IX: «Being a Priest Today», downloaded from https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/it/books/documents/hf_jp-ii_books_19960301_dono-e-mistero.html [accessed: 01/11/2021].

¹⁵⁸ The Galileo Affair which happened almost 400 years ago, was still very important issue for John Paul II and the Catholic Church because it impacted to the clearly position of the Catholic Church respecting to the Modern Science: whether the Church is an enemy of the science (and technology) development and whether science and religion are the opposite and unreconcilable realities. By this academic multi-perspective investigation of the case of Galileo, the Pope intended to overcome prejudices which may impede or limit a dialogue and cooperation between sciences and religion. (Cf. Mariano Artigas, «Galileo después de la comisión Pontificia,» in *Scripta Theologica* 35 [2003/3], p. 753, 759)

¹⁵⁹ George Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, p. 630.

¹⁶⁰ Artigas investigated some negative responses after the Commission had declared their report and the Pope had accepted that report and had given his further hope for a continual dialogue between science and religion. He then resumed some points of the negative responses: 1) the authoritarianism as the root of the errors which was not recognized and has still been actual; 2) the discourse which consisted of the inaccuracies, mis-functions of the Commission; 3) the error of judging

time, had considered with his patience and prudence the Galileo case at least from two points of view: in one hand he had considered that which seemed to be scientific evidence, but in the other hand, he also considered the theological propositions based on the Sacred Scripture. He then stated that «we do not understand, rather than affirm as false what has been demonstrated.»¹⁶¹ From that statement, the decision for Galileo was not too clear. However, because of the strict relation between the Christian faith and the ancient cosmological vision and for the sake of defending the teaching and tradition of the Church, the Church then decided to forbid Galileo for teaching his theory and, as a result, they gave a disciplinary punishment which made Galileo suffer until his death. Their judgement was clearly taken from the scientific vision of that times which is nowadays considered as an error. The commission recommended that the Church had to declare openly and sincerely that she was wrong. The Pope received the report and the recommendation of the commission by affirming that the objective falsity was indeed made by the Church even though it was neither understood nor felt remorse, even though it was

a scientific question which cannot be recognized and cannot be repeated; 4) the Church which cannot admit the errors; 5) and the impossibility of dialogue between science and religion.

Artigas himself argued that the Pope had sufficiently done to confess the Church mistakes in the past and to ask forgiveness, including for committing the coercions and violence, at least two times when the report declared October 31, 1992 and when he proclaimed the «Day of Pardon» in May 12, 2000 even though he did not precisely mention the Galileo case. In November 10, 1979 in the day, he intended to re-examine the Galileo case, after listening to short history of Galileo, Pope John Paul II considered Galileo's suffering as a person and a faithful member of the Church. He knew that Galileo had three important virtues that are also convinced by the Church: 1) he affirmed explicitly that only God is the source of the truth of the faith and the truth of science so that they both are not contradictory; 2) he recognized that the divine power illuminates the man to search for the truth through science; 3) he also formulated the epistemological norms to agree with the Sacred Scripture and science.

The work of the Commission, according to Artigas, had faced many difficulties. The members of the Commission came from various disciplinaries of sciences with various personal backgrounds. It was not easy to achieve some agreements between many different perspectives and personalities with all their advantages and disadvantages. It could not be said that there were sufficient archives and documents, and it was not easy to value or interpret those using various perspectives, and it was clear that it was also difficult to examine all subjective motives behind those which had been written. For those reasons, it was not fair to criticize the work of the Commission generated nothing or just for the purpose of the legitimation of the Church. As Cardinal Poupard mentioned, the work of commission had finished by presenting the report to the Pope, but the deeper and better investigation of the Galileo case is still open for all researchers since there may be found new documents or facts related to this case.

(See further. Mariano Artigas, «Galileo después de la comisión Pontificia,» p. 755-784)

¹⁶¹ George Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, p. 630.

recognized further the subjective motives of the judgment. He then stated that the Church should comprehend from this valuable experience since it had disclosed «the myth» around the Galileo case by the multi-disciplinary perspectives. He also reminded the Church to make a continual dialogue with sciences, and hoped that such error that had been committed in the Galileo case would not happen again.¹⁶²

In August 1983, John Paul II also held a biennial series of the summer humanities seminar at Castel Gandolfo. He invited many scholars and intellectuals from various backgrounds: Christians, Jewish, Agnostics, Atheist concerning about the main topic: «Man in the Modern Sciences.¹⁶³ Some well-known thinkers participated such as Hans-Georg Gadamer, Charles Taylor, Emmanuel Levinas, Johann Baptist Metz, Gerhard Ebeling, Tischner, Mischalski. The Pope was attentively listening but sometimes also interrupting, and at the end of seminars, he offered a personal summary, commentaries on implication for the Church as well as the societies. In that occasion, he showed his warmed heart to Levinas, a Jewish philosopher of dialogue, to whom pope had known well his works.¹⁶⁴

John Paul II was also convinced that the special dialogue between science and theology could be compared with the ecumenical movement in which at the last decades it seemed to almost be impossible to realize it, but the effort to make the ecumenical dialogue had gradually, step-by-step been fruitful.¹⁶⁵ Sciences and theology could be capable of making a dialogue when all good scientists desired to obtain the whole and integrated knowledge, and, above all, when they started to talk each other as the partners at the deeper level with the greater openness and respect to other autonomous perspectives, finding the common ground and searching for the truth.

2.2.3. Some Conclusions about Wojtyła (John Paul II)'s Idea of Dialogue

A Dialogue is, for Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II, more than a conversation, an exchange of the ideas, a discussion or a debate on a particular topic or issue. A Dialogue is always a sphere for the personal encounters in which each of the

¹⁶² Cf. Mariano Artigas, «Galileo después de la comisión Pontificia,» p. 784.

¹⁶³ George Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, p. 466-467.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 467.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 552.

partners of dialogue bring with himself or herself all the uniqueness of his or her personality, cultural, social, political, historical background, with the full awareness that they exist and act together. That living together presupposes a real experience that «I» interact and build a relationship with «You», and that interaction and relationship gradually becomes a «We» when «We» freely decide together to have some common goals that «We» want to achieve through «Our» common actions. In that common action, each person manifests himself or herself, obtains his or her self-realization, and at the same time, manifests with the other their unity and lead themselves toward the common good. That common good, which is bound each person into a unity of «We» and would be realized through the common actions, is also a result of a dialogical process in which each person continuously searches together for the truth and, thanks to the truth which by nature recognizes the good, also seeks together the good for the community. Therefore, Wojtyła's idea of dialogue, first of all, has to be considered in the relation between participation and the common good. That idea of dialogue has, at least, three inseparable dimensions, that is, the anthropological dimension which refers to a basis of dialogue in the intersubjectivity through participation, the epistemological dimension which refers to a path of searching together for the truth, and the ethical dimension which refers to a path of seeking together the true good for the community. Thanks to participation which has the fullest meaning in the act of taking a share into the humanity of the other, this idea of dialogue can thus be applied in any level of human relation.

It is important to note that Wojtyła firmly hold the primacy of person over any kind of human relation, but he agrees that, thanks to twofold functions of consciousness, every man is aware of and lively experiences his co-existence and co-operation with others and the fact that he influences and is simultaneously formed by that experience. The primacy of person over the human relation points out not only the metaphysical and epistemological (including methodological) sense, but also the axiological in which any kind of human relation has to respect human dignity as a person, not merely an object or an instrument, even for the good of many or community. In this sense, dialogue has a fundamental root in the nature of human person who interacts, lives together and builds a «We» by deciding the common goals that bonds «We» relationship.

Engaging a dialogue is never an easy path as same as building a reality of «We» because of the multiplicity of the persons with all their personal

uniqueness. The condition becomes exacerbated by any form of the egocentrism or the skepticism about the living together, the desire to possess and dominate, the historical wounds, prejudices, etc. It would be getting worse when these situations are used as the legitimacy to commit violence or injustice against the other persons, the other communities or the other societies. In the theological sense, the situations in which we experience the human division and separation as such has its radical root in the sin, that is, a profound condition of being far from or even rejecting God, the other and the self. In those situations, the call for a dialogue is getting stronger.

A dialogue is never an end, but always a means toward an end. Dialogue aims to find out what is true and good, especially in the situations of conflict because in such situations what is true and good becomes vaguer whereas the truth and the good are still needed to develop the person and enriches the community. In those difficult situations, a dialogue becomes a means to rediscover what is right, what is true, what is good and what is just. The first thing that can be done to arrive at those true, good, and just, through a dialogue, is to examine and evaluate oneself: the way of thinking, the way of acting, the inner dispositions, the prejudices, the horizons, etc. Therefore, a dialogue aims to eliminate some views and dispositions that are clearly subjective because they can lead toward any tension, conflict and disagreement. Accompanied by performing penance which aims to overcome sin by transforming one's innermost heart and radically changing the life, a dialogue is also a special means for a reconciliation which has a profound meaning to overcome sin and to rebuild a true relationship with oneself, the others and God since the root of the separation of man with himself, with others and God is sin.

Participation and man's natural inclination to the truth and the good are elements of the essences of person which have some limitations, including in the theological perspective that human being is an imperfect being due to sin. The man cannot solely rely on their natural abilities to overcome the sins so he always needs the redemptive grace that was bestowed by God through his Son, Jesus. Therefore, if a dialogue is a means for the man's reconciliation with himself, the others and God, then it cannot only rely on the man's capacity, but it needs a grace as a fundamental spiritual basis. At this point, John Paul II's actions of the ecumenical as well as the interreligious prayer can be considered as the actions to ask God's grace for a communion of all Christians in one Church and of the all mankind as brothers and sisters before God, the

almighty Father. The grace will strengthen to actualize participation and to illuminate his searching for truth, good and just.

Dialogue thus requires, for Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II, some basic attitudes: 1) love of the truth and humility in the presence of the truth, 2) openness to, acceptance of, and affirmation of the equality with the other and its otherness or differences; 3) mutuality or reciprocity: mutual understanding, mutual respect, etc.; 4) solidarity, including opposition, or a readiness to join with the other in the common action and in a contribution to the community for the good of each member and the common good; 5) rejection of the non-authentic attitudes of conformity and non-involvement; 6) 'metanoia' or a radical transformation of life toward the truth and the good as God's will for defeating the sin which is a root of human division and separation.

Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II had not only explained the dialogue in his philosophical as well as theological writings, but he had performed it so he was really called as the pope of dialogue. When he said that dialogue is never easy path for dialogue but it is really the possible one, he told it not as a theory, but he had experienced how really hard to engage a dialogue. Therefore, he bequeathed not only the idea of dialogue, but also many legacies and milestones in the acts of the ecumenical and the interreligious dialogue, of dialogue as a diplomacy style, of dialogue between science and faith, of the intercultural dialogue, etc. In this sense, he shows that the authentic dialogue obtains his fullest meaning in the action, in *actus personae*. Therefore, all dimensions of dialogue with all required basic attitudes in its basis, also has a practical character.

2.3. *The Characters of the Man-Person of Dialogue*

Based on Wojtyła's principles of dialogue, I try to formulate several characters of a man-person of dialogue. It is important to remind that we cannot ignore his primary understanding of the man as a person. Person is irreducibly considered by Wojtyła in the framework of the dynamic correlation of person and his action. We also have to formulate it in the scope of participation with the authentic attitudes of solidarity and opposition. These characters I mention below should be arranged based on Wojtyła's *Person and Act* which guides us to the profound understanding of man-person in himself and in participation with humanity of other as well.

2.3.1. Man-Person of dialogue is a man who is really aware of his personhood and its dynamic correlation with his action

Wojtyła emphasizes the role of consciousness and self-consciousness, together with knowledge and self-knowledge as a constitutive aspect of Ego or the self or the I.¹⁶⁶ In the action, the man does not only consciously act but he also aware that he is an efficient cause of his action and also lively experiences it. Through consciousness, the man interiorizes all those experiences, his exteriority as well as his interiority.¹⁶⁷ By being aware of and experiencing those lived experiences, the I does not cease to be shaped. The richer experience, the richer the I would be formed.

The experience of the 'man-acts' which is a part of the experience of man reveals person's transcendence and integration in the action. The person is aware and lively experiences that he is a subject to the action based on his self-determination and freedom. Self-determination itself is based on the complex personal structures in which the man possesses himself and is, at the same time, possessed by himself (self-possession), and he also governs himself and is, at the same time, governed by himself (self-governance). Therefore, the man is free and autonomous, and nothing outside of himself can dictate his choice and decision.

Nevertheless, Wojtyła considers human freedom not in the sense of absolute freedom since human freedom has by nature a reference to the truth which also by nature corresponds to the good. The awareness of freedom which corresponds to the truth and the good, also reveals the reality of person's transcendence in his action, in which the man-person is really a spiritual being. In its dynamics regarding the truth and the good, freedom is accompanied by moral conscience, sense of obligation and responsibility. If by performing an action toward some good, the man manifests all his spiritual aspects, he thus reaches his self-realization. Such self-realization would be the source of his felicity.

The reference toward the truth and the good is found as the nature of man's faculties. In particular, Wojtyła highlights a close connection between the reason and the will. The man is not merely a vegetative or an emotive being, but indeed a spiritual being who is, thanks to those faculties, always searching for the meaning of his life, that is, for the truth and the good. For that reason, human dynamism (human *operari*) is not only natural, but person-

¹⁶⁶ Cf. PA, p. 79; AP, p. 36.

¹⁶⁷ Cf. PA, p. 74; AP, p. 34.

al. The human becoming (*fieri*) is, therefore, not only about the physical and psychical dynamism (a progressive or degenerative process), but also, the most important, a moral dynamism (a process of becoming a good or a bad person).

Moreover, the man-person of dialogue is also aware that his action does not only reveal the reality of man as a spiritual being, but also the fact that man has the integrated somatic and psychical dimensions. In every action performed, the soma and the psyche also play the specific and distinctive roles. The body, or the exterior visible part of the soma, is the external expression of human interiority, the psyche as well as the spiritual. If I am angry, sad, disappointed, satisfied or happy, those expressions can almost be seen in my 'body language'. When I act, at the same moment, I am aware that my soma, my psyche and my spiritual powers are all in dynamic. Therefore, the integration and the transcendence of person in the action are, according to Wojtyła, two inseparable dimensions which are fully manifested in human action performed by a person. In the performing action, both dimensions work together in a harmony, affect one another, and complete to each other. The unity of person's transcendence and integration in the action does not only reveal the reality of person in the action, but, thanks again to human consciousness, also becomes a reality that is realized and lively experienced by man, and thus continuously shapes the I.

Therefore, the man-person of dialogue is, first of all, a man who is aware of his entire personhood which is fully manifested by performing an action.

2.3.2. Man-Person of dialogue is a man who is also aware of the other as an I

As it has earlier been asserted, thanks to consciousness, the man can interiorize not only the consciousness of himself (self-consciousness), but also of all the world he experienced, including about another person. From my point of view, in my consciousness of the other person (including his actions, attitudes, behaviours, habits, opinions, and so forth), he becomes the object of my consciousness. By considering him as an object of my consciousness, I consciously open to the presence of other regardless of whether I want to accept or relate to him or not. I know and am conscious that the other is different from any other things, from another person, and absolutely from me.

How can I have an experience of the other? It is surely because of the undeniable fact that I exist and act together with other. Wojtyła does not reject the classical doctrine about man's social nature, but he rather intends to stress

a concrete experience that the man always exists and acts together with other. The experience of co-existence is broader and more fundamental than the experience of co-operation. Both experiences reveal that the man has a basic capability to exist and, consequently, also to act together with other despite the fact that the ability varies in any levels in each person. Therefore, this ability is considered by Wojtyła as a property of the man-person, namely, participation.

By considering the real experience of other and comparing the other with my own self, I know that the other is an I, a person like me. It does not mean that the existence of other is a result of a deduction from the I. I am free, autonomous, and different from the other, so does the other who is free, autonomous and different from me (my I). It is true that other's existence makes me more aware of my own I, but it does not signify that either his or her existence (other's ontological structure) or the understanding of other (other's epistemological structure) are deduced from my ontological and epistemological structure, and vice versa. Thanks again to consciousness and self-consciousness, my autonomy and the autonomy of others are evident, as are their differences from one another. This consciousness and self-consciousness lead me toward the acceptance and the acknowledgement that I and the other are both the I, both are subjects to the actions, are equally autonomous, both forming ourselves by experience, and of course, all of this leads me to recognition that I and other are equally person. Like me, the other also has a distinctive structure as a person with self-determination and freedom, and that he or she manifests himself or herself, achieves self-realization by performing action, and continuously develops awareness of his or her personhood. I accept and confirm the truth about his/her existence as a person.

The openness, acceptance and acknowledgment of other as another I, fosters a respect for other as he or she really is. This respect is also based, first of all, on the fact that he or she is a person, and the fact that as a person, he or she also directs himself or herself toward the truth and the good, regardless of all social, cultural and religious identity. If I and he or she have different opinions, beliefs, visions about something, I cannot lose my respect to him or her since my respect to him/her is, above all, based on my openness, acceptance and acknowledgment that he or she is a person, an I, just like me. In a concrete relationship between I and the other, the demand to develop a reciprocity is also important. Because I am not only responsible to myself but also for others, and vice versa, then I and the other must mutually open up, accept, acknowledge and respect for each other.

Therefore, while still promoting the truth and the true good, the man-person of dialogue must fight against all forms of manipulation and falsehood that may cause a distortion of the truth, especially the truth about human dignity which can trigger an unfair treatment of others because they are not considered as a person, but as a mere instrument or object. The falsehood can appear in the simplest form, such as hoaxes or lies, propaganda or ideological indoctrination.

Therefore, the man-person of dialogue is a man-person who is always aware of considering and treating the other as a person, as an I, whoever he or she is and whatever the differences are.

2.3.3. Man-Person of Dialogue is a man who is aware of the unity of «We» with all its consequences

The fact that I am aware of and lively experiences my co-existence and co-operation with other does not only make me open, accept and acknowledge the truth of other as an I, but also introduces me further and deeper into the experience of participation. In the participation as Wojtyła thought of, I perform a common action with other so both mutually manifest our own selves as well as our communion, both attain self-realization of each and also together realize our certain common good. In that experience of acting together, on the one hand, I manifests my personalistic value and reach my self-realization, and at the same time, on the other hand, I manifest «our» communion and lead «our» action toward «our» common goal. The other also does it too. In this sense, without ceasing to be myself and the other's self, manifesting the personalistic values and obtaining self-realization, 'we' actualize the common action for our communion.

The communion against human division and separation in every level of human life was one of the innermost dreams of Wojtyła. He had endeavoured to make it happened. The communion he dreamt never meant a uniformity and a neglect of the diversity. It should be characterized by solidarity. By solidarity he meant a readiness to get involve and act together and also to actualize freely a self-giving or sacrifice for other and community. The communion, therefore, presupposes that all man-persons endeavours to be realized it without considering diversities as an obstacle, but, in turn, as a strength as well as challenge. It is sure that such communion is always a dynamic harmony of its diverse elements.

Accompanied by the spirit of solidarity, the common action should reflect 'our' searching together for the truth and the true common good. The truth has

to be a principal reference to re-examine and re-evaluate humbly and sincerely any opinions, argumentations, visions, horizons, behaviours, tendencies and actions. Of course, it is not easy, as Wojtyła said, because the truth that is firmly held especially respecting to a certain social, cultural and religious identity of each person as well as of community or society, may impossible to be united or certainly difficult to dialogue. At the most difficult point, the closest truth that has to be referred is the truth of the man as a person who has a value or dignity in himself. All forms of the differences, even the strife and the conflict must submit to and respect the indisputable truth about human dignity.

The same thing may also happen when we face the facts about the differences of views, tendencies, behaviours and actions related to the good and the common good. Dialogue has to emphasize primarily not in an agreement, a consensus, nor a common understanding, but in the human persons themselves who are gather in a dialogue. Moreover, we know that the common good is one of the constitutive elements of community. It has both the objective and subjective dimensions. The community itself has the persons as the substantial elements. Therefore, the common good can never violate human rights. Nor can, for the sake of the truth of tradition or religion, human dignity be violated. For example, beliefs or religions may be different, each person may also have their own assessment of those religions, but a basic right that must be respected is the freedom to choose a faith and put it into a religious practice. Running a business for profit is also a right, but getting a fair wage should never be neglected. Making a choice about the life is also the right of everyone, but making the choice to end one's life or the life of the fetus is certainly not a true good choice. Again, if there is a difference, the first reference that must be held is the closest truth, that is, human dignity as a person.

Therefore, the man-person of dialogue is a man who is aware of the communion of «We» through participation. It implies his choices to promote and defend human dignity because the relation of «We» and «our» simply refers to a person as the only substantial element who has value in himself.

2.3.4. Man-Person of Dialogue is a man who attains self-realization in the dialogical action toward the true common good

Wojtyła/John Paul II admitted that a dialogue is never easy but still worthy to make it happens. Dialogue that has been carried out does not sometimes bring the satisfactory results as expected. However, since dialogue is so

valuable, it is worth fighting for. Dialogue presupposes a patience and perseverance in the process step by step. As he has shown, a dialogue can start from a personal encounter. In the philosophy of dialogue, an encounter becomes the important category of the interpersonal dialogue. The encounter means being present as a fellow person and opening up to each other so they can know and then accept each other. Such an encounter must be impressive so there is a longing to meet again and repeat the process of opening up to each other so they can know and accept each other. The purpose of such encounters is to build a close and personal relationship. The realm of this encounter is to build awareness that I really exist with others.


The dialogical encounters, for Wojtyła/John Paul II can take place in some joint activities or cooperation for the common good of community, ranging from simple things to the big things. For instance, there is no need to wait to have an agreement or a consensus or one accord in the political accord or the religious beliefs to help the victims of the natural disaster. The openness to others who suffer can be a simple and sincere vocation that unites the persons to act together without much deliberation. While working together, the interpersonal dialogue takes place, for example knowing each other's potentials, then sharing roles in the concrete cooperation.

The dialogic encounters must also open up to a possibility for a serious discussion regarding the differences of viewpoints, ideas, or even beliefs. In this kind of the dialogical encounter, each person or party must be fully aware of its equal position as the partners of dialogue in the dignity as well as in the rights and obligations based on equality. Each person or party must also be humble and sincere to listen to each other as they really are, ask each other and respond to the points of the discussion as the other person or party understands it in order to fully understand it from their point of view, not mine. A humble and sincere attitude is also developed to dare to evaluate views, beliefs, points of view, behaviour, habits, etc., especially things that hinder relationships and joint actions for the common good.

Therefore, the man-person of dialogue is a man who always endeavours to engage the dialogical encounters as many as possible. This action is always considered as a manifestation of himself and his effort to obtain self-realization. In other word, the dialogical action has to be a concrete *actus personae* for the man-person of dialogue.

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